Russia has employed missiles similar to Tomahawks since Day 1 of...
Mick Ryan, AM@WarintheFuture
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Oct 13, 2025
~4 min read
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Russia has employed missiles similar to Tomahawks since Day 1 of the full-scale invasion. This is NOT escalation. It is just leveling the playing field for a three-year-long Ukrainian long-range strike campaign that has now achieved critical mass and momentum. How have they done this? 1/16 🧵 🇺🇦
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msn.com/en-us/news/wor…
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2/ Back in 2022, when Ukraine received HIMARS, it changed the game. Ukraine could now hit Russia at depth. But it was clear even back then that Ukraine had bigger plans for making Russia hurt through even deeper strikes.
mickryan.substack.com/p/striking-fur…
mickryan.substack.com/p/striking-fur…
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3/ By the 2nd half of 2023, Ukraine’s strategic aspirations for deep strike against Russia were clear. As I wrote back then, “throughout the war the Ukrainian Armed Forces have undertaken a range of adaptations to their force posture, structure and processes to enhance their operational effectiveness. Their development of more complex, long-range strike capabilities stands out.”
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4/ By 2024, a maturing targeting, strike, assessment, weapon absorption (foreign) / development (indigenous) was in place in #Ukraine. I wrote in 2024 about the various elements (see below) but that ongoing enhancements in long-range strike effectiveness would require attention to the following five issues.
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5/ Orchestration. The ability to synchronise operations in way that gives it the best chance of success by presenting the enemy with multiple dilemmas they cannot resolve.
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6/ Prioritisation. What should be the priority for limited missiles and long-range strike systems? Should the degradation of Russian oil infrastructure be the highest priority because of the potential economic impacts? Or should strikes against strategic military targets, such as airfields and factories, be the priority because of the political and humanitarian costs of Russia’s strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure?
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7/ Access to weapons. The complexity and cost of strike weapons will also have a major impact on Ukrainian access to weapons. Missiles such as Storm Shadow and ATACMs are not built in the same quantity as artillery munitions and are much more expensive. There is a limit to how many of these weapons might be provided.
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8/ Assessment. Assessment is used to measure progress of any major operation, campaign or strategy. Those responsible for the Ukrainian strike complex will need to continuously hone their assessment process so that the strike complex can be employed most efficiently and to best effect.
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9/ Political Issues. While countries such as Britain have endorsed Ukraine using long range missiles in strikes against Russian targets, the Americans were more limited in their support. It was one needing to be resolved if the Ukrainians were to increase the suffering felt by the Russian military.
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10/ By late 2024, Ukraine was employing its increasingly impressive planning and strike capabilities to destroy large numbers of munitions depots and oil refineries/storage depots across Russia and at increasing range from Ukraine.
mickryan.substack.com/p/munitions-de…
mickryan.substack.com/p/munitions-de…
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11/ In support of this, Ukraine was generating a rapidly improving capacity to design and build long range strike drones.
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12/ By this year, the Ukrainians had developed a tempo of strategic strike operations that was beginning to overwhelm Russia’s ability to adapt its air defences as effectively and quickly as needed. This was a combination of more Ukrainian strikes, with larger warheads with more range. The longer the range of Ukrainian weapons, the much larger square mileage of Russia that must be defended. At the same time, Ukraine was destroying Russian air defence systems, further complicating Russia’s problems. mickryan.substack.com/p/ukraine-stri…
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13/ The Ukrainian “Deep Strike Complex” has now achieved a critical mass and momentum. It is hurting Russia’s economy, hurting Putin domestically, and demonstrating to western political leaders that Ukraine retains agency in this war. Indeed, the long, almost four year process that has seen us arrive at this point is shifting the momentum in this war.
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14/ Several world political leaders now have big decisions to make:
Putin: how much longer can his nation sustain the economic damage of Ukraine’s strikes without entering real negotiations?
America: how much more support should the U.S. provide (intel, weapons, etc) to continue improving Ukrainian strikes?
Xi: does China provide direct support to help Russia defend its airspace and ensure it can prolong fighting, which is in China’s interest?
Putin: how much longer can his nation sustain the economic damage of Ukraine’s strikes without entering real negotiations?
America: how much more support should the U.S. provide (intel, weapons, etc) to continue improving Ukrainian strikes?
Xi: does China provide direct support to help Russia defend its airspace and ensure it can prolong fighting, which is in China’s interest?
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15/ What the Ukrainians have achieved with their hybrid deep strike complex in the past four years is nothing short of stunning. It offers a look at 21st century strike operations, and many lessons for how other nations can and should transform their own long-range strike capabilities - and their national air, missile and drones defences.
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16/ Back in August, I published a piece that explored the ten key lessons from Ukraine’s ongoing development of long range strike operations. We have much to learn from them - are we heeding the insights that Ukrainians have paid such a high price for? End.
mickryan.substack.com/p/smashing-rus…
mickryan.substack.com/p/smashing-rus…