This is an another excellent thread from @Tatarigami_UA that...
Mick Ryan, AM@WarintheFuture
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Jun 21, 2024
~4 min read
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This is an another excellent thread from @Tatarigami_UA that explores Russian tactical adaptation in eastern #Ukraine. In particular, the shift to infiltration tactics is interesting. A thread on tactical innovation and why it needs to be nested within operational plans. 1/22 🧵
Tatarigami_UA@Tatarigami_UA
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Russian forces are revamping their assault tactics after experiencing failures with their current structure. The Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are getting replaced with a new unit called the "Assault Unit" or "Assault Detachment", which I will discuss in this thread.
Russian forces are revamping their assault tactics after experiencing failures with their current structure. The Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are getting replaced with a new unit called the "Assault Unit" or "Assault Detachment", which I will discuss in this thread.
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2/ These types of infiltration tactics are something that also emerged as a solution to a stalemate on the Western front in WW1. While generally the Germans are given credit for this (known as Stormtrooper tactics), this approach originated elsewhere.
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3/ French officer, Captain Andre Laffargue, was wounded in 1915 and during his convalescence wrote a pamphlet called "The Attack in Trench Warfare". You can read it here: gutenberg.org/files/60197/60…
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4/ It was published in 1916 and described a system of infiltration by well trained volunteers using automatic weapons, mountain guns and other weapons to move swiftly through an enemy's defensive positions.
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5/ Not long after its publication, a copy of his pamphlet was discovered in a captured German trench. While it was translated into German and distributed widely, it is not referred to in later German tactical doctrine.
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6/ So, there are a lot of unknowns about the link between this first publication on infiltration tactics and the 1918 German stormtroopers tactics that appeared on the Western front. But, despite the effectiveness of these tactics, there was a major problem with them.
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7/ The new German tactics were not aligned with an operational approach that could exploit these new tactics. They could create gaps in an enemy defensive line, but could not then move an 'exploitation' force through these gaps deep into the enemy's rear.
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8/ Nor did their appear to be a desire to do so. As German commander Ludendorff told one of his Army Group Commanders, "I forbid myself to use the word 'strategy'. We chop a hole. The rest follows." Good tactics are wasted without operational art or good strategy.
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9/ As Gudmundsson writes in his book, "Stormtroopers Tactics": "In 1918, the German infantry could use stormtroopers tactics to tear gaps. As long as following formations relied on muscle power for mobility however, these holes could never be turned into war winning victories."
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10/ So there are a couple of challenges for the Russian Army if it is to start using these tactics in the east.
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11/ First, to use these tactics widely, the Russians will need to implement a wide scale retraining and re-equipping program in the middle of a war. This includes troops in theatre, and those that are being trained at home.
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12/ We should not under estimate the challenge of doing this in a system that is under great pressure and that has lost many of its middle and junior leaders. Do they have the institutional agility for this?
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13/ Second, and more importantly, the Russian military needs a plan to exploit the tactical gaps that might be created with such tactics. Once again, having good tactics won't win the war for Russia.
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14/ Just ask Germany. Good tactics in WW1 and WW2 did not help them win the wars they started. As Murray and Millett have written: “Mistakes in tactics can be corrected, but political and strategic mistakes live forever.”
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15/ Russian exploitation of these tactical 'gaps' created by new tactics would require strong, mobile reserves - based on armoured and mechanised forces - that have the leadership, authority and agility to penetrate deep into Ukrainian territory.
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16/ Such a operational penetration would aim to dislocate large parts of the Ukrainian defensive scheme of manoeuvre, while destroying HQ, logistics, reserve troops and longer-range artillery.
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17/ It is not clear that the Russian Army in #Ukraine now possesses the ability to create tactical 'break ins' and then conduct (and logistically support) operational exploitation. Their losses in personnel, leaders and equipment have been massive.
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18/ And even if the Russian were able to concentrate these mechanised reserves, it is highly probable that it would be detected and interdicted by Ukrainian long range fires. The Ukrainians are very good at this!
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19/ So while the Russians are demonstrating some evolution and learning with these new tactics, it is an incomplete adaption.
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20/ To quote Ludendorff, the Russians have just created a new way to 'chop a hole'. Without the full range of operational systems to exploit them it is just a more creative way of killing an entire generation of their young people.
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21/ Thanks again to @Tatarigami_UA for the ongoing and excellent assessments published here. Like many others, I find them superb. End.
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22/ Thank you to the following for the links and images used in this thread: Project Gutenberg MilitaryHistoryNow @Tatarigami_UA @Liberov @MaryanKushnir @Osinttechnical @UAWeapons