1/ Second thread with summary of former #Wirecard supervisory board...
Martino@SkyMartiner
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Jul 13, 2024
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1/ Second thread with summary of former #Wirecard supervisory board member Dr. Anastasiya Lauterbach's testimony yesterday, and today on February 8, 2024.
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2/ Here the first thread with detailed information on her statements part I, a lot of information were conveyed.
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x.com/SkyMartiner/st…
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3/ She reports about several instances when the company responded to damaging news from outside with certain actions, for example a #Wirecard share buyback, executed in October 18, 2019. She explains she was mostly in favour of a share buyback, but was against it in this instance, and had viewed some of the company's responses to crisis issues like a "record that is being played again, and again, and again."
She explains now here as a former #Wirecard SB member that shortly before EY signing the audit for 2018, the billion $ SoftBank deal was announced, which now seems suspicious to her.
She explains now here as a former #Wirecard SB member that shortly before EY signing the audit for 2018, the billion $ SoftBank deal was announced, which now seems suspicious to her.
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4/ Dr. Lauterbach further explains, "look, I have been socialised in an anglo-american audit system where many investors including the CEO are part of the supervisory board. If something goes wrong, it is discussed along with the CEO how to react in favour of the company".
She then states that former #Wirecard CEO Dr. Braun had in her view "oftentimes created problems by himself".
For example in March 2019, when in her view he expressed his view to investor analysts in a clumsy way, which she would have communicated in a different way.
When asked if SB vice-chair Stefan Klestil did things better in her view, she denies.
She then states that former #Wirecard CEO Dr. Braun had in her view "oftentimes created problems by himself".
For example in March 2019, when in her view he expressed his view to investor analysts in a clumsy way, which she would have communicated in a different way.
When asked if SB vice-chair Stefan Klestil did things better in her view, she denies.
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5/ She explains that on April 30, 2020, Thomas Eichelmann talked to Dr. Braun, which resulted in the plan to appoint new #Wirecard management board positions, at least a CCO and a CSO.
Candidates for these positions were put on court display, high-profile Silicon Valley candidates from Google, Salesforce, Palo Alto Networks, CISCO. Names displayed included Taal, Coces, Hentschel, Tuznik.
Candidates for these positions were put on court display, high-profile Silicon Valley candidates from Google, Salesforce, Palo Alto Networks, CISCO. Names displayed included Taal, Coces, Hentschel, Tuznik.
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6/ Dr. Lauterbach goes on to explain how particularly the legal department was needed to be expanded. She was not in #Wirecard's HR committee, which was lead by others.
She goes on to explain that in her view an extremely competent legal candidate was brought into the company for interviews. She turned down the job once she found out she was about to be placed working under - not above - Andrea Goerres.
She goes on to explain that in her view an extremely competent legal candidate was brought into the company for interviews. She turned down the job once she found out she was about to be placed working under - not above - Andrea Goerres.
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7/ Dr. Lauterbach states that she had the impression that compliance was never taken really seriously at #Wirecard, she interacted mostly with Susanne Steidl.
Marsalek had mostly managed using Telegram also because of his many travels, and Dr. Braun was mainly focused and interested in company growth, he wanted to avoid #Wirecard to become a bureaucratic organisation. She supported Marsalek to be taken off the management boards for a long time.
Only when the major investors allegedly pressured Dr. Braun they would not want to tolerate lack of compliance any longer in around May 2020 did things change in her view.
Marsalek had mostly managed using Telegram also because of his many travels, and Dr. Braun was mainly focused and interested in company growth, he wanted to avoid #Wirecard to become a bureaucratic organisation. She supported Marsalek to be taken off the management boards for a long time.
Only when the major investors allegedly pressured Dr. Braun they would not want to tolerate lack of compliance any longer in around May 2020 did things change in her view.
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8/ Dr. Lauterbach further explains that McKinsey, who was appointed at the end of April 2019 by the supervisory board to conduct an internal company and organisational capability assessment, recommended among other around 30 compliance positions in 4 different international hubs, the results of McKinsey study were in general "not great for Wirecard", she says.
As a result, #Wirecard's Steinhoff was promoted. McKinsey was not chosen for implementation of their findings for cost reasons, despite them having gained experience in the VW scandal and with Siemens.
As a result, #Wirecard's Steinhoff was promoted. McKinsey was not chosen for implementation of their findings for cost reasons, despite them having gained experience in the VW scandal and with Siemens.
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9/ She is questioned about the #Wirecard bank credit over 35 million euros to Dr. Braun, which was re-payed weeks later by the former CEO. Wulff Matthias confronted SB with this credit and had it gone through, Braun was required to pay the loan back over a short time, which he did, including interest back to Wirecard Bank.
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10/ Dr. Lauterbach explains she travelled to the US from August 6 - 14, 2019 with Susanne Steidl. She raised the issue of more transparency to Steidl, who was surprised about that concern, needed "input to program IT system accordingly".
#Wirecard
#Wirecard
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11/ She was also asked about #Wirecard's TPA business, mentions she had first heard of it in McKinsey's report. For reports about TPA, she had to go to forensics, was not allowed to copy, only view documents by the use of her fingerprints.
TPA issues were flagged to her when MCA mathematik reported about it in around September 2019. To her, Marsalek and Haeusler-Axner were responsible for the TPA.
She knew about Al-Alam, heard about employees in Singapore and was familiar with MCA business in Brasil and Turkey. She states that EY's Fichtenberger was directly in charge for TPA audits.
TPA issues were flagged to her when MCA mathematik reported about it in around September 2019. To her, Marsalek and Haeusler-Axner were responsible for the TPA.
She knew about Al-Alam, heard about employees in Singapore and was familiar with MCA business in Brasil and Turkey. She states that EY's Fichtenberger was directly in charge for TPA audits.
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12/ Dr. Lauterbach is asked if she knew about the trust accounts in Asia. She says yes, she had the impression that the trust accounts were suggested and arranged by EY in order to have the income outside of #Wirecard's balance sheets.
When judge explains her that he understands the idea of trust accounts to be the exact opposite, to be included as an advantage, as assets into #Wirecard's balance sheets, she tells that she fully knew about the entire structure of the TPA's only through KPMG's reports in 2020.
When judge explains her that he understands the idea of trust accounts to be the exact opposite, to be included as an advantage, as assets into #Wirecard's balance sheets, she tells that she fully knew about the entire structure of the TPA's only through KPMG's reports in 2020.
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13/ She was asked about the review of #Wirecard's trust accounts in Manila, and Dr. Braun's response. When questioned why she believes Dr. Braun had tried to influence KPMG's preliminary reports in April 2020 through ad-hoc messages, she states she would not know.
When the judge asks further question if she would know the term "capital market responsible statement", she still does not understand what that would mean and how this would have motivated Dr. Braun.
She had observed Dr. Braun to be concerned, but not in panic when KPMG's report were routed in April/May 2020. When she read Braun's April 22, 2020 statement regarding the KPMG situation, she states she was shocked, along with the "entire supervisory board".
When asked if this was maybe due to the responsibility of the management board, she states she would not remember.
When the judge asks further question if she would know the term "capital market responsible statement", she still does not understand what that would mean and how this would have motivated Dr. Braun.
She had observed Dr. Braun to be concerned, but not in panic when KPMG's report were routed in April/May 2020. When she read Braun's April 22, 2020 statement regarding the KPMG situation, she states she was shocked, along with the "entire supervisory board".
When asked if this was maybe due to the responsibility of the management board, she states she would not remember.
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14/ A #Wirecard credit issued to oCap in 2019 was discussed as well. She stated she had not been informed about oCap before, and heard the name for the first time then. She had not known that oCap was formerly named Senjo, only that it was a subsidiary of Swiss Life.
Judge displays a report from YND Technology on screen, which assessed oCap's software, and came to the judgement in June 2020 to "stop the software development". She had no knowledge of it.
Judge displays a report from YND Technology on screen, which assessed oCap's software, and came to the judgement in June 2020 to "stop the software development". She had no knowledge of it.
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15/ She was asked if she had known a company named 'Ruprecht', which was a planned substitute for #Wirecard TPA Al-Alam in February 2020. She could locate Ruprecht in the Baltics, as far as she remembers.
Concerning the 2019 billion $ SoftBank deal, she was informed about it by Dr. Braun during a lunch with him on April 16, 2019.
Concerning the 2019 billion $ SoftBank deal, she was informed about it by Dr. Braun during a lunch with him on April 16, 2019.
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16/ Dr. Braun asked Dr. Lauterbach if EY had reacted appropriately to Rajah&Tann report, she states not in her view, explains the measures taken by EY, like chosen transaction records.
Bellenhaus asks Dr. Lauterbach if she knew that EY employees Fichtelberger and Kocher were in charge of TPA audit, he presents an EY document which explains, quote, "the Third-Party-Acquisition audit is a main focus of the company audit". The EY document also explicitly states that the "IT Environment of Al-Alam" is to be audited.
In Dr. Lauterbach's view, Dr. Braun knew very well about #Wirecard's business model, he could explain the various business schemes well, though not always in total deep detail, of course.
Bellenhaus asks Dr. Lauterbach if she knew that EY employees Fichtelberger and Kocher were in charge of TPA audit, he presents an EY document which explains, quote, "the Third-Party-Acquisition audit is a main focus of the company audit". The EY document also explicitly states that the "IT Environment of Al-Alam" is to be audited.
In Dr. Lauterbach's view, Dr. Braun knew very well about #Wirecard's business model, he could explain the various business schemes well, though not always in total deep detail, of course.
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17/ Noteworthy is also that Dr. Lauterbach stated that she had heard of Mr. Steinhoff promoting in the early days of June of 2020 the idea of a 'Special Audit' for the #Wirecard KPMG special audit because of the many issues regarding KPMG's preliminary reports starting around April 2020.
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18/ Dr. Anastasiya Lauterbach concluded her testimony with the words: "It was an honour having been here and to testify in front of this #Wirecard court."