We are now 5 months after the start of Ukraine's 🇺🇦 Vivaldi...
Clément Molin@clement_molin
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Oct 22, 2026
~7 min read
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We are now 5 months after the start of Ukraine's 🇺🇦 Vivaldi operation and it has now officially ended
A month after the operation was revealed, we know have much more information on the biggest Ukrainian success of the year.
🧵THREAD🧵1/18 ⬇️
A month after the operation was revealed, we know have much more information on the biggest Ukrainian success of the year.
🧵THREAD🧵1/18 ⬇️
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This year, I presented multiple times what Russian 🇷🇺 plan was, as we can imagine it thanks to KABs strikes, offensive axes and troops concentrations.
The plan was to (and is still) encircle Donbas from the south, but also the north, after taking Lyman.
The plan was to (and is still) encircle Donbas from the south, but also the north, after taking Lyman.
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We can now say this with certainty, the Ukrainian counter-offensive managed to prevent any offensive on Lyman, Izium, Sloviansk and further Barvinkove.
Right now, the Izium-Sloviansk highway is out of reach of most of the FPV drones.
Right now, the Izium-Sloviansk highway is out of reach of most of the FPV drones.
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About how the operation was conducted, my thread from September is still very accurate, corresponding to most of the information that were later published by official sources.
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Clément Molin@clement_molin
After 4 months of the Lyman counter-attack, Ukraine 🇺🇦 3rd Army Corps managed to cut Russian 🇷🇺 salient north of Lyman and liberate more than 200 km2
This is one of the most important victory for Ukraine in 2026 which will delay the offensive on northern Donbas
🧵THREAD🧵1/20⬇️
This is one of the most important victory for Ukraine in 2026 which will delay the offensive on northern Donbas
🧵THREAD🧵1/20⬇️
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40 days later, let's come back to the fact that I "revealed" the information, which sparked criticism :
-I did not reveal the offensive; there were already numerous rumors and posts circulating online.
-A number of Russian and pro-Russian accounts had shared a great deal of information starting August 15, indicating that they were already aware of it.
-Most of the offensive operations—including the effort to cut off the salient—had already concluded by September 9; I used only information dating from August 25 or earlier.
-The offensive was initially slated to be announced before the end of August, but the publication date was pushed back by two weeks following further successes (which I did not cover).
-In reality, the criticism is primarily directed at the fact that I did not follow the official release schedule (I acknowledge that adhering to such a schedule is part of the units' duties).
-I did not reveal the offensive; there were already numerous rumors and posts circulating online.
-A number of Russian and pro-Russian accounts had shared a great deal of information starting August 15, indicating that they were already aware of it.
-Most of the offensive operations—including the effort to cut off the salient—had already concluded by September 9; I used only information dating from August 25 or earlier.
-The offensive was initially slated to be announced before the end of August, but the publication date was pushed back by two weeks following further successes (which I did not cover).
-In reality, the criticism is primarily directed at the fact that I did not follow the official release schedule (I acknowledge that adhering to such a schedule is part of the units' duties).
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Now, I would like to address the massive gaps in information, whether on the part of recognized analysts, think tanks, or media outlets.
Barely any of them had foreseen the operation; most only discovered it the day I published my findings. Only a handful of volunteers, researchers, individuals, osinters, and experts were truly in the know. Others possessed only fragments of information. This highlights the extent to which the information available to us regarding the war in Ukraine actually originates from a very small number of independent actors.
Furthermore, I must point out the repeated theft of my maps that day—often without any attribution—as well as the vague or imprecise way in which some cited their sources. This operation serves as evidence that, while operational secrecy can never be absolute, it is nonetheless effective at concealing a significant portion of information. Only a select few analysts have access to such data and control the narrative.
Barely any of them had foreseen the operation; most only discovered it the day I published my findings. Only a handful of volunteers, researchers, individuals, osinters, and experts were truly in the know. Others possessed only fragments of information. This highlights the extent to which the information available to us regarding the war in Ukraine actually originates from a very small number of independent actors.
Furthermore, I must point out the repeated theft of my maps that day—often without any attribution—as well as the vague or imprecise way in which some cited their sources. This operation serves as evidence that, while operational secrecy can never be absolute, it is nonetheless effective at concealing a significant portion of information. Only a select few analysts have access to such data and control the narrative.
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Let us now examine the operation in greater detail.
With the Ukrainians having released dozens of videos and interviews, including previously withheld footage that has now been made public, it is clear that the operation began much earlier than initially thought, as far back as March.
With the Ukrainians having released dozens of videos and interviews, including previously withheld footage that has now been made public, it is clear that the operation began much earlier than initially thought, as far back as March.
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The initial objective was to clear out Russian infiltrators. These efforts were accompanied by an intensification of drone strikes, followed by a localized offensive on the western sector of the front, which served as a diversion.
Meanwhile, the main force launched a mechanized assault from the north, penetrating deep into Russian-held positions. Ukrainian forces advanced cautiously in small groups, supported by aerial drones, used both to strike Russian targets and to conduct reconnaissance, as well as ground-based drones, which facilitated resupply and the destruction of Russian bunkers.
Meanwhile, the main force launched a mechanized assault from the north, penetrating deep into Russian-held positions. Ukrainian forces advanced cautiously in small groups, supported by aerial drones, used both to strike Russian targets and to conduct reconnaissance, as well as ground-based drones, which facilitated resupply and the destruction of Russian bunkers.
1:55
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Despite the heavy use of Russian guided bombs, the Ukrainian advance continued, with many of these munitions missing their intended targets.
For an offensive operation, the Ukrainians sustained relatively few casualties compared to previous engagements. Conversely, the defending Russian forces suffered significantly higher losses, largely due to the rapid encirclement of at least three regiments, not all of which managed to escape the area.
For an offensive operation, the Ukrainians sustained relatively few casualties compared to previous engagements. Conversely, the defending Russian forces suffered significantly higher losses, largely due to the rapid encirclement of at least three regiments, not all of which managed to escape the area.
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Simultaneously, mid-range strikes disrupted Russian logistics, while Ukrainian forces targeted command posts and captured soldiers, including officers, securing valuable intelligence.
Officially, approximately 270 soldiers were reportedly captured; we have evidence confirming at least 90 of them. Others, presumably, were not filmed so as not to reveal their identities, in the event of an exchange or in case they were to join the Russian volunteer corps.
Officially, approximately 270 soldiers were reportedly captured; we have evidence confirming at least 90 of them. Others, presumably, were not filmed so as not to reveal their identities, in the event of an exchange or in case they were to join the Russian volunteer corps.
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The scope of the operation is, in reality, somewhat broader than what was reported back in September. Since then, the Ukrainians have continued their push and advancement toward the Zherebets River.
They have reached it at several points, and Russian forces no longer control any territory west of this river—with the exception of the forest east of Lyman. Parts of the foresteast of Lyman, as well as Zarichne and some nearby villages remain in the "gray zone," but despite various rumors, I have not been able to confirm that the Ukrainians have actually crossed the river.
They have reached it at several points, and Russian forces no longer control any territory west of this river—with the exception of the forest east of Lyman. Parts of the foresteast of Lyman, as well as Zarichne and some nearby villages remain in the "gray zone," but despite various rumors, I have not been able to confirm that the Ukrainians have actually crossed the river.
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It is quite notable how effectively the Ukrainians have cleared the forests east of Lyman; this has fully secured the city, which now lies well behind the front lines and can therefore be resupplied.
Furthermore, it allows the Ukrainians to position their artillery within these forests to defend Sloviansk, while also enabling them to cross the Siverskyi-Donets River without being under the constant threat of FPV drones—particularly in the area around Izium.
Furthermore, it allows the Ukrainians to position their artillery within these forests to defend Sloviansk, while also enabling them to cross the Siverskyi-Donets River without being under the constant threat of FPV drones—particularly in the area around Izium.
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South of the Donets river, the Ukrainians launched operations—coinciding with the arrival of General Drapati to lead the Ukrainian forces—aimed at pushing back the Russians and eliminating enemy infiltrations.
At this stage, it is clear that these operations have resulted in the recapture of territory and the clearing of certain infiltrated areas; however, I prefer to maintain a broad "gray zone" designation for now, given that many Russian positions still remain.
At this stage, it is clear that these operations have resulted in the recapture of territory and the clearing of certain infiltrated areas; however, I prefer to maintain a broad "gray zone" designation for now, given that many Russian positions still remain.
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Thus, on both sides of the Donets River, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps—now under the command of the "Center" army group—has succeeded in securing the northern flank of the Donbas and continues efforts to stabilize the situation east of Sloviansk, as autumn and winter gradually set in.
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What can be expected going forward, and what are the possibilities for the coming weeks and months?
For the time being, I believe the Ukrainians will focus on consolidating their gains and adopting a defensive posture. First, they must secure their gains—notably around Lyman—and continue clearing the forest east of that city, while also securing the eastern approach to Sloviansk, particularly near Mykolaivka.
For the time being, I believe the Ukrainians will focus on consolidating their gains and adopting a defensive posture. First, they must secure their gains—notably around Lyman—and continue clearing the forest east of that city, while also securing the eastern approach to Sloviansk, particularly near Mykolaivka.
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From there, they need to organize a coherent and solid defensive line between Sloviansk, Lyman, and Borova. At the same time, the Ukrainians—specifically under the command of the "Centre" group—must consolidate the front around Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.
This is General Biletsky’s priority. Future offensive actions could take place during the winter or even in the spring, depending on weather conditions. I do not believe the Ukrainians will cross the Zherebets River. They hold highly advantageous defensive positions; for the Russians, crossing would be extremely difficult, as they would have to navigate a series of about ten dams along the Zherebets River and its associated lakes—a maneuver that would leave them highly vulnerable.
This is General Biletsky’s priority. Future offensive actions could take place during the winter or even in the spring, depending on weather conditions. I do not believe the Ukrainians will cross the Zherebets River. They hold highly advantageous defensive positions; for the Russians, crossing would be extremely difficult, as they would have to navigate a series of about ten dams along the Zherebets River and its associated lakes—a maneuver that would leave them highly vulnerable.
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The Ukrainians will therefore need to hold these lines, and they are likely to do so far more effectively than when they suddenly lost ground over a year and a half ago.
As for a future offensive, I could imagine the Ukrainians pushing north from Borova toward Kupiansk, with the aim of shifting the front line away from the Borova sector—and perhaps even reaching the southern outskirts of Kupiansk, thereby freeing the city from some of the ongoing infiltrations. Naturally, this would be carried out in coordination with the Ukrainian forces stationed further to the north.
As for a future offensive, I could imagine the Ukrainians pushing north from Borova toward Kupiansk, with the aim of shifting the front line away from the Borova sector—and perhaps even reaching the southern outskirts of Kupiansk, thereby freeing the city from some of the ongoing infiltrations. Naturally, this would be carried out in coordination with the Ukrainian forces stationed further to the north.
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Thank you for following this new analysis regarding the final information about Vivaldi opeation.
Now that the northern flank of Donbas is secured, at least for some time, the focus will concentrate on the southern flank, as well as Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv.
Now that the northern flank of Donbas is secured, at least for some time, the focus will concentrate on the southern flank, as well as Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv.
