How liberal financial order paved the way for violent regimes: the untold story of Hitler’s rise

Hitler’s Early Backers

Most accounts of Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 explain it primarily through internal German factors: economic depression, social fragmentation, and the punitive consequences of the Treaty of Versailles. While these conditions mattered, they do not provide a complete explanation.

Hitler’s ascent was also shaped by international financial, political, and social networks that formed well before he took power. Transatlantic elites in Germany, Britain, and the United States observed, evaluated, and in some cases facilitated his rise from an early stage.

To understand how a marginal political figure was able to transform into the leader of a state that would soon plunge the world into the deadliest conflict in human history, it is therefore necessary to examine who supported him at the beginning of his career.

In November of 1922, Captain Truman Smith of the United States Army, who at the time was an Assistant Military Attaché in Berlin, visited Munich and met Adolf Hitler for the first time. Hitler’s ability as an orator had such a profound effect on Captain Smith that he believed Hitler would be a significant political leader in Germany. Smith filed a report with Washington, describing Hitler as a “marvelous demagogue” and stated that Hitler could influence large crowds [1].

Through Smith’s visit, Hitler gained a contact that would change the course of his career. Ernst “Putzi” Hanfstaengl, a Harvard-educated cosmopolitan of German and American descent, was invited to attend a Nazi rally [2]. Hanfstaengl was impressed by Hitler’s charisma and potential. He soon became one of Hitler’s close confidants, helping financially and refining his public image. Not only did Hanfstaengl finance the Nazi newspaper Völkischer Beobachter in 1923, but he also introduced Hitler to high-society circles and, as he later claimed, arranged a meeting with Winston Churchill in 1932 [3]. Hanfstaengl also stated that he helped Hitler put on the Nazi rallies in a much more theatrical way, including using cheers similar to those used at Harvard University football games; developing fanfares to music based on the football song tradition at Harvard University; and popularizing the use of the phrase “Sieg Heil,” as well as assisting Hitler in learning how to create propaganda for the Nazi party [4].

Later, Hanfstaengl fell out with the Nazi inner circle and fled Germany. By 1942 he was in U.S. custody, working on President Roosevelt’s “S-Project”, where he provided intelligence on Nazi leaders and contributed to an OSS psychological profile of Hitler.

Right from the start, ties formed a key part in how Hitler climbed up — far from being solely homegrown. From the beginning, his ascent was observed — and at times quietly abetted — by transatlantic figures who recognized his potential long before he seized power.

Some question how much Western money backed Hitler’s rise. Dr. Yuri Rubtsov, a military historian, argues that Hitler “didn’t start World War II on credit from Berlin; the tab was picked up by the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of England.” According to Rubtsov, American and British financial strategists pursued a clear objective: to gain control of Germany’s monetary system—because whoever controls the money controls the state—and, through Germany, to reshape Central Europe.

While Western authors often label such assessments “polemical,” the underlying evidence aligns with documented financial history. From 1919 onward, U.S. and U.K. banks, led by firms such as J. P. Morgan & Co. and the Bank of England, systematically reorganized German reparations and debts under the Dawes and Young Plans. These measures not only stabilized the Reichsmark but also tightened Anglo-American leverage over German industry and credit flows—a dynamic well recognized in both Western and Russian scholarship [5].

Establishing the Framework for U.S. Financial Influence

From 1919 to 1924, the United States quietly prepared the conditions for a massive inflow of American capital into Germany [6]. After the U.S. formally entered WWI, it loaned over $8.8 billion to the Allies—mostly Britain and France [7]. By 1921, America was owed more than $11 billion in war debt [8]. The Allies, however, were cash-strapped and struggling to pay. Their solution was to turn to Germany – the defeated foe – and extract crushing reparations to service the Allied debt [9]. In 1921, the reparations bill was fixed at 132 billion gold marks (about $31.5 billion) [10], far beyond Germany’s capacity. When Germany defaulted on deliveries in early 1923, France and Belgium sent tens of thousands troops to occupy the Ruhr – Germany’s industrial heartland – as “collateral” for unpaid reparations [11].

The Ruhr was the heart of Germany’s coal and steel industry. Right before the occupation, it produced about three quarters of the country’s coal and more than half of its steel, so losing it was a devastating blow [12]. The occupying forces took control of mines, railways, and factories, provoking fury across Germany. The German government declared a campaign of passive resistance: workers went on strike en masse, factories and railways ground to a halt, and even civil servants refused to follow orders from the occupiers.

Tensions soon escalated. On March 31, 1923, French soldiers opened fire on German workers protesting at the Krupp steel plant in Essen, killing about a dozen people and wounding many others [13]. A few weeks later, a nationalist ex-officer, Albert Leo Schlageter, carried out acts of sabotage against French rail lines. He was captured and executed by firing squad in May 1923, becoming a martyr for German ultranationalists.

French Overreach and Anglo-American Opportunism

The actions of France and the policy of Premier Raymond Poincaré (Prime Minister of France) to cut the Ruhr and Rhine regions off from Germany, just as France had done with the Saar mines, caused widespread concern [14]. British political leaders believed that Poincaré’s policy would effectively “detach German territory from Germany” and create an irrevocable division of the country.

In response to Poincaré’s decision to occupy the Ruhr, Britain flatly refused to support France in this endeavor. In reality, American and British leaders viewed France’s misstep(s) with quiet approval. As U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes noted in early 1923, it was wise for America to “wait for Europe to grow up so we can accept the American proposal” for financial help in resolving the matter.

The steps France took unknowingly provided a favorable position to U.S.-British interests at a future time. The Ruhr occupation ultimately turned out to be very damaging economically to France — draining both France’s treasury and causing international goodwill to erode — and by the end of 1923, Paris was seeking a way to save face and withdraw from the Ruhr occupation. At that point, Wall Street came forward with a “rescue plan” for Germany, but only on Wall Street’s terms.

As the Ruhr crisis continued to escalate, Germany’s economy rapidly fell apart. Because Germany could no longer afford to make reparations payments to France, and because Germany had to continue funding its passive resistance, the Weimar government began issuing large amounts of new money, and thus began the hyperinflation of 1923. Prices rose exponentially fast. By late November 1923, one United States dollar was valued at approximately 4.2 trillion German marks, and essentially, the value of the German mark was negligible. All savings were destroyed, wages lost value within hours, and the economy came to a near complete halt until the crisis was resolved in mid-November with the establishment of the Rentenmark — a new currency that provided temporary relief. [15]

Wall Street Rescues Germany – and Takes Control

With strong backing from Washington, an international committee led by American banker Charles G. Dawes put together a plan to stabilize Germany’s economy and reorganize its reparation payments. The resulting Dawes Plan (1924) was presented as a humanitarian rescue package, but in reality it amounted to a financial takeover of Germany’s economy [16].

The groundwork for the plan had been forming since the early 1920s, when German bankers such as Hjalmar Schacht argued that reparations must be revised and foreign capital attracted to restart production. Appointed President of the Reichsbank in December 1923, Schacht quickly became the key German representative in the international negotiations that followed. Though not formally part of the Dawes Committee, Bank of England Governor Montagu Norman played a decisive behind-the-scenes role. His personal friendship and professional alliance with Schacht helped to secure British and American confidence in Germany’s stabilization effort. Working alongside J. P. Morgan & Co., Norman kept a tight schedule, where Morgan Jr., at the helm of the firm, took on key roles across America—guiding how funds from the Dawes agreements moved primarily via British-controlled banks.

John Foster Dulles, who was then a Wall Street attorney and U.S. Delegation legal counsel, also had a significant part in defining how Western countries could handle the flow of money after World War II. He was involved with the development of the legal and economic framework that was developed for German reparations at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. In addition to influencing the flow of capital, debts and credits for many years, the structures he designed were a basis for policy-making related to the Dawes and Young Plans [17].

These frameworks were not independent; They required private banking networks that could enforce their use across borders and throughout financial systems. The Warburg family is considered among the most powerful banking families in the world. On both sides of the Atlantic, they were represented by two brothers, Paul (a co-founder of the Federal Reserve System in America) and Max Warburg (the head of M.M. Warburg & Co., an investment firm located in Hamburg). Max Warburg advised successive Weimar government administrations on finance.

The Warburgs had a significant presence within the circles of power in both Europe and North America. Max Warburg operated internally within Germany’s stabilization apparatus and interacted with international creditors. Paul Warburg was situated in the U.S. financial world and associated with Morgan era financing; he therefore had an impact on the political and economic climate in the U.S. which would allow for massive scale lending to be feasible.

However, there was no “win-win” in this case. Germany received short-term stabilization but at the cost of long term dependency. The Dawes plan placed creditor priority above all else, and then presented it as the basis for reconstruction. All of the oversight and enforcement mechanisms under the Dawes plan were controlled by Anglo-Americans, who included individuals from the same social network as J.P. Morgan (i.e., Morgan associates) in some of the most important positions. For example, Owen D. Young, a Morgan associate, was one of the principals of the Dawes Plan. Additionally, S. Parker Gilbert, another individual who was part of that social network, was appointed as the Agent General for Reparations.

Schacht had long-standing ties with Max Warburg [14]. During the Weimar years, Warburg held a seat on the General Council of the Reichsbank from 1924 to 1933, serving during Hjalmar Schacht’s presidency. In this capacity, Warburg was closely involved in currency stabilization and foreign loan negotiations, operating within the same transnational financial networks that linked the Reichsbank to Anglo-American banking interests, particularly those associated with the Morgan group. From the late 1920s onward, Warburg also increasingly aligned himself with Zionist financial and organizational initiatives, reflecting a parallel engagement with projects that combined capital transfer, state-building, and international finance [42].

When the Dawes Plan was being designed, both Warburg brothers’ networks played decisive roles. The plan’s framework passed through bankers like Morgan, Dawes, and Schacht—but behind them stood long-established Warburg connections linking Hamburg, New York, and London. Through these channels, Wall Street gained control of Germany’s credit, currency, and industrial investment under the guise of “reconstruction.”

The Dawes Plan cut Germany’s reparations in half, but its real goal was to make Germany safe for U.S. investment. It included a $200 million loan—half from Morgan’s bank—in exchange for deep Anglo-American control over Germany’s currency, budget, and credit system [15]. Germany’s reparations gold didn’t stay in Europe; it made a round trip through Wall Street.

The gold Germany paid as reparations was quickly sold, pawned, or transferred to the U.S., where it was repackaged as “financial aid” under the Dawes Plan and sent back to Germany. Germany then passed it to Britain and France, who used it to pay off their war debts to the U.S. The U.S., now earning interest, would then re-lend it to Germany again.

The loan cycle was a vicious one and Germany was literally operating solely on borrowed money. Everybody knew if Wall Street cut off the flow of money to Germany it would be in ruins. In order to repay the loans, Germany gave up shares of many of its top companies to American investors.

In this way, U.S. capital quickly became an integral part of the German economy. By the end of the decade, Germany had become the second-largest industrial power in the world—but much of that industrial base was now in the hands of American financial and corporate elites.

By 1929, the Young Plan had replaced the Dawes Plan, tightening foreign control over Germany’s finances under the same Anglo-American supervision. Drafted by a committee led by Owen D. Young, founder of Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and associate of J.P. Morgan, it extended Germany’s reparations schedule and reaffirmed the role of private U.S. banks in managing payments through the newly established Bank for International Settlements. In essence, the Young Plan transformed the Dawes “rescue” into a permanent financial occupation—one that bound Germany’s economy to Wall Street and London just as the global crash approached.

Oil, Industry, and the Limits of Financial Control

By the end of the 1920s, control over Germany no longer relied only on credit and reparations. Financial leverage had expanded into currency management, sovereign debt, and direct ownership of industrial assets. At that point, the issue was no longer whether Germany could borrow, but whether its economy could physically function. Credit alone could not restart factories, move railways, or sustain heavy industry. Industrial recovery required secure access to strategic raw materials, above all energy. This was the moment when financial control translated into control over production itself.

That shift brought finance directly into the realm of resources. Oil became decisive. One of the clearest examples was Henri Deterding, a Dutch national and head of Royal Dutch Shell, an Anglo-Dutch corporation deeply embedded in Britain’s economic and political elite.

Deterding spent much of his time in Britain and maintained close ties with British power circles. By the interwar period, he had become one of the most influential energy figures in the world. A committed anti-Bolshevik, Deterding viewed Hitler as a necessary instrument for restoring order in Germany and blocking Soviet expansion [18]. His support was driven by strategic calculation rather than ideological affinity. Through Shell’s networks and his own political influence, Deterding helped ensure that German industry retained access to its industrial lifeblood at a moment when financial pressure alone could have brought it to a halt.

This shows an important omission from most of the mainstream histories about Hitler: the international support for Hitler did not stop with either banking or diplomatic support; it included the control of all the raw materials that would be required to recover Germany’s industrial base and create the ability to wage future wars. By the early 1930s, Hitler’s rise was supported by domestic forces, and the more abstract concept of credit alone; but also by a larger and more globalized convergence of finance and industrial interests that were willing to risk their bets on him as a tool of geopolitics.

These industrial and resource networks were not separate from one another; they merged through a central person that was able to integrate Germany back into the international finance arena at the same time as integrating it politically. Hjalmar Schacht as Germany’s connection to the dominant international banking network run by J.P. Morgan & Company and the Bank of England under Montagu Norman, with whom he maintained a long personal and professional relationship through the Bank for International Settlements [16]. Starting in 1931, Hjalmar Schacht joined the Harzburg Front, a bloc of nationalist and conservative elites. As he moved closer to Hitler’s movement, he helped funnel industrial money into the Nazi campaign through the Nationale Treuhand account he controlled [17].

Triggering a Financial Collapse to Pave the Way for Hitler’s Rise

When the Wall Street crash occurred in October 1929, American banks faced liquidity pressure at home and immediately recalled foreign loans to stabilize their own balance sheets. Germany, as the largest foreign debtor, was hit first and hardest. Once U.S. lending slowed and then stopped, German banks lost access to rollover credit. Depositors began withdrawing funds. International investors followed.

The U.S. Federal Reserve and Morgan’s bank abruptly cut off lending to Germany, triggering a financial collapse [20]. German production capacity remained, but the economy could no longer refinance itself.

British policy compounded the crisis. In 1931, Britain abandoned the gold standard, forcing an international monetary realignment. This move protected British finances but cut Germany off from stable currency anchors and access to foreign exchange. What remained of Germany’s financial oxygen was removed.

The economic collapse of 1931–1932 destroyed the remaining foundations of Germany’s political and financial order. Under these conditions, political elites did not seek to create a new ideologue or vision for the future; they wanted a figure who could restore stability, control the volatility of the time and stabilize a collapsing system. After being appointed chancellor in January 1933, Adolf Hitler inherited a system that was already operating under authoritarian controls established by conservative elites. Suspension of parliamentary authority, censorship, bans on other political parties and rule by emergency decrees were all already in existence. Liberal democratic principles of government had already been abandoned in practice. Thus, when Adolf Hitler became the leader of Germany, it was not to establish an authoritarian system, but to operate one that already existed, applying it in accordance with objectives defined by those who had put it in place. He was therefore elevated within this framework as a perceived solution to widespread instability and social breakdown. This causal connection was later acknowledged in the testimony of Hjalmar Schacht [19].

On January 4, 1933, a pivotal meeting took place at the Cologne home of banker Kurt von Schröder. Present were Hitler and Franz von Papen, then Vice Chancellor of the Weimar Republic. The meeting cleared Hitler’s path to power. Within weeks, on January 30, he was appointed Chancellor, with Papen as his deputy [21].

Schacht worked behind-the-scenes, to build alliances with Hitler’s movement by helping to financially support him through people such as Fritz Thyssen, and companies such as IG Farben, especially after the Nazis got an electoral foothold in 1930. Schacht also helped to link the big business with the Nazi party at a time when Germany was recovering from the economic collapse of 1929.

IG Farben became one of the largest industrial conglomerations in Europe by the late 1930s, and played a key part in the development of the German military-industrial complex. While it has been argued that the exact degree of American influence over the German banking system is unclear, it is agreed upon that the global finance industry (including both the United States and Great Britain) had a significant role in the construction of the German economy, and ultimately enabled the emergence of the Nazi government.

By the end of spring of 1933, while still heading up Germany’s central bank, Hjalmar Schacht made a visit to America. Only a few months had elapsed since Adolf Hitler came to national power as Germany’s leader. During this visit he met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, United States Treasury Secretary William H. Woodin, and high-ranking individuals on Wall Street, including executives of both J. P. Morgan & Co., and Kuhn, Loeb & Co. [22] The stated reason for the visit was to “reassure international investors”, but the true reason was to obtain assurances from American finance that would continue to support the new German regime.

Schacht’s visit resulted in no formal agreement being published which is consistent with what typically occurred with high level diplomatic finance at that time; however, his visit can be interpreted by looking at official meetings he attended, what he later said about his visit and what policies came into effect as a result of the meetings. The focus of Schacht’s visits centered around stabilizing the value of the German currency, providing foreign capital with access to Germany, and assuring American investors that their investments would remain safe under the new German government. This visit represented the transition from the economic disaster that led to Hitler gaining national power to the acceptance of the new Nazi regime in the Western capitalist world. It also represented the start of a plan to incorporate the Third Reich into the same transnational financial network that created it.

Financial Cooperation and the Road to War

After 1933, international capital remained engaged. Western corporations and banks continued to work with Hitler’s government, sustaining the economic machinery of the Third Reich as it prepared for war. Foreign investment — whether in the form of money, energy, technology, or know-how — flowed directly into the sectors of the German economy that were critical to the development of Hitler’s war machine.

In effect, these foreign investments created the conditions for Nazi Germany’s rearmament. The rapid expansion of Nazi Germany’s military capabilities was therefore not accidental; it was the direct outcome of foreign capital financing rearmament, combined with the transfer of technologies that enabled large-scale war production. The Nazi war machine was already being developed prior to 1939, and that development involved the active participation of foreign nations and their corporations.

1. IG Farben and the Industrial Nexus
IG Farben was an industrial conglomerate that produced many goods for the Nazi economy in Germany. Executives from the company met with other industrialists on February 20, 1933, and agreed to give Hitler large amounts of money for his political campaign [23]. IG Farben received a great deal of business from the government as a result of this agreement; including the development of new types of synthetic fuels, synthetic rubber, and chemicals, which were all important to rearming Germany.

2. Standard Oil, Royal Dutch Shell, and the Transatlantic Energy Axis
Standard Oil, run by the Rockefeller network, had close ties to IG Farben both technically and commercially, before and after the Nazi party came into power. The companies used patent-sharing and joint-venture agreements to develop synthetic-fuels for Germany’s industrial and military needs.

It is important to note that this energy network was not based on American capital only. Royal Dutch Shell, an Anglo-Dutch company, embedded deep within British society, also provided Germany with access to oil and energy resources throughout the interwar period. As the head of Shell, Henri Deterding allowed Shell to be a “stabilizing factor” in Germany’s industry, at a time when the pressure from the financial crisis would have otherwise led to the collapse of the entire system.

These two systems worked together to ensure that Germany’s industrial base continued to receive access to fuel, technology, and raw materials while its financial position was precarious.

3. U.S. Corporate Involvement
Companies like General Motors, ITT, and Ford were able to maintain their operations inside of Germany throughout the 1930s and profit off of the Nazi economic recovery. The Wehrmacht was supplied with vehicles by Opel (a part of GM) and Ford’s operation in Germany contributed to the war effort. Businesses still earned money off of their operations inside of Germany after Hitler took over [24].

By 1941, total U.S. investments in Nazi Germany were estimated at over $475 million:

4. The American–German Industrial Web
In 1929, The American IG Chemical Corp. was established as the U.S. affiliate of the German IG Farben to provide for continuous interaction between German industrialists and American financiers. General Electric had an interest in A.E.G., the Allgemeine Elektricitätsgesellschaft (General Electric Company), and ITT owned interests in German telecommunications companies and in Focke-Wulf, the German aircraft manufacturers[31]. From 1932 to 1939, GM invested approximately $30 million into German-based manufacturing sectors, generally through joint ventures with IG Farben [32].

5. Ford’s German Subsidiary, Volkswagen, and Ideological Sympathies
While Ford’s German subsidiary continued to be active through the entire 1930s, supporting growth of the industrial sector, Ford himself had written, spoken publicly about his sympathy with the ideology of the National Socialist (Nazi) movement - a fact that is documented [33], although an uncomfortable one.

6. The Anglo-German Transfer Agreement and MEFO Bills
In the summer of 1934 the state of Anglo-German relations in terms of trade had undergone considerable improvement under the terms of the Anglo-German Transfer Agreement. At that time, the Schröder Bank was acting on behalf of the banking interests of Germany in London. In addition, by the summer of 1934, Hjalmar Schacht, who was also serving concurrently as both the German Minister of Economics and the President of the Reichsbank, prepared a confidential document titled “The State of War Mobilization,” concerning the secret war plans of Germany for the next conflict [35].

To secretly finance its military re-armament, Schacht developed a scheme using “MEFO Bills.” These were off-budget promissory notes that were being used by a shell company, called MEFO GmbH. This allowed the government of Germany to fund the military without having the expenses reflected on their accounting statements. The spending could be hidden from view since no record existed that indicated anything different than what appeared.

7. The Bank for International Settlements: The Financial Bridge
One of the primary instruments for maintaining transatlantic financial coordination was the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), established in 1930 in Basel under the terms of the Young Plan [36]. Formally created to manage German reparations payments, the BIS quickly evolved into a hub for informal coordination among central banks, including those of Germany, Britain, and the United States.

Max Warburg represented the Reichsbank on the BIS Board of Directors, while Bank of England Governor Montagu Norman served as Britain’s principal representative. Although American private banks did not formally hold seats on the BIS board, U.S. financial interests, particularly those associated with J.P. Morgan & Co., were deeply intertwined with BIS operations through reparations management, international lending, and continuous informal coordination with European central bankers.

As political tensions intensified during the early 1930s, the BIS functioned as a neutral institutional space where relationships between national financial systems remained intact, allowing cooperation to persist above political and ideological divisions.

Zionist–Nazi Economic Cooperation: The Haavara Agreement

While cooperating with Anglo-American banks and corporations, Nazi Germany also entered into a formal economic partnership with Zionist organizations, institutionalized through the Haavara Agreement signed in August 1933 [37].

The agreement was made between the German government, the Zionist Federation of Germany, and the Anglo-Palestine Bank, which acted as the banking institution of the Jewish Agency under the British Mandate in Palestine. The purported objective was for the emigration of German Jews to Palestine while permitting a portion of their assets to be transferred outside of Germany where capital controls existed on an asset level.

The mechanism was clearly commercial; German Jews would deposit heir private assets in Reichsmarks into designated German Banks. Those funds were then utilized to acquire German industrial and agricultural goods that would be sent to Mandate Palestine. Upon sale within Palestine, the proceeds from those sales would be placed into the accounts of the emigrants in local currency [38].

For Germany, the Haavara Agreement worked as a state-approved export mechanism, bringing in foreign currency at a time of serious balance-of-payments strain and helping reduce the impact of the international anti-Nazi boycott launched in 1933. For the Zionist organizations, the agreement provided them with the necessary capital, equipment and tens of thousands of highly trained and skilled immigrant workers needed to develop the economy of the future state of Israel.

Crucially, not everyone was eligible to immigrate to Palestine.

Palestine was administered under the British Mandate, and immigration was strictly controlled by British authorities through a rigid quota system. Entry was determined almost exclusively by economic and administrative criteria, not humanitarian ones.

Most entry visas were granted to:

This framework inherently favored German Jews. On average, they were more educated, more urbanized, and possessed greater financial resources than their Eastern European counterparts. Many were therefore able to demonstrate the financial independence required by British authorities, particularly through the Haavara mechanism.

Polish Jewry, by contrast, found migration to Palestine nearly impossible. During the interwar period, the majority of Poland’s Jewish population lived in deep poverty and lacked both the capital and professional credentials demanded by the Mandate’s immigration regulations. Admission depended on economic self-sufficiency, technical expertise, and demonstrable usefulness to the colonial economy.

In practice, the system operated not as a humanitarian refuge but as a selective economic filter, admitting those who could generate capital while excluding those who could not.

By 1939, approximately sixty thousand German Jews had immigrated to Palestine, transferring an estimated 100 million Reichsmarks in assets (roughly $6 billion today). At the same time, Germany had become Palestine’s largest trading partner, underscoring the fundamentally economic character of this migration framework [38].

Money flowed into the Haavara Agreement (Haavara Scheme), utilizing channels established by Britain’s Imperial Economy. As Palestine was under British Mandate, all movement related to goods moving from Germany on ships, insurance for such movements, registering new settlers in colonies and currency exchange moved directly to firms in London, England. The approval process was also handled by banks acting as a part of the United Kingdom. Firms in London would insure against risk of loss when shipping goods from Germany globally.

At the same time, Zionist money operations had close ties to Wall Street, which brought in large sums of money, supported various projects in Palestine, as they channeled those funds through Jewish organizations in the United States [41] to create a Triangular Financial Corridor:

The Young Plan, Bank for International Settlements operations, and corporate-industrial collaboration, just like the Dawes Plan, were not constrained by ideology. They were constrained by finance. What ultimately mattered were financial priorities: the construction of a new international financial structure and the groundwork for a new state in the Middle East. Ideology functioned as a secondary layer. Financial structure was decisive.

By the end of the 1930s, the foundations of a new world war had already been laid—not by ideology alone, but through coordinated financial and industrial cooperation that reached across the Atlantic.

Today in the west there has been a long-standing endeavor to revise the origin of World War II, depicting it as an epic battle of democracy versus tyranny while obliterating the role of elite Anglo-American leaders who provided financial backing for; traded with; and legitimacy for the Nazi Regime.

In reality, the road to war was paved not only by the ambitions of Berlin, but also by the profits of London and Wall Street. Those very same entities that financially backed the rise of Hitler would present themselves as the architects of peace.

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