Abdollah Shahbazi's weird analysis: 1. An Israeli regime-change war...
Farzan Sabet@IranWonk
34 views
Dec 22, 2025
~5 min read
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Abdollah Shahbazi's weird analysis:
1. An Israeli regime-change war on the IRI is certain
2. Israel has deeply penetrated Iranian society
3. A new mass uprising for regime-change is possible
(The Pahlavi movement is the dominant opposition)
youtube.com/watch?v=_tkZZW…
1. An Israeli regime-change war on the IRI is certain
2. Israel has deeply penetrated Iranian society
3. A new mass uprising for regime-change is possible
(The Pahlavi movement is the dominant opposition)
youtube.com/watch?v=_tkZZW…
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Caveat 1: What's weird aren't his conclusions-they track for me-but that HE reached them.
Shahbazi was a historian & analyst from a leftist background linked to the Islamic Republic's intelligence community & parastatal conglomerates and an antisemite & conspiracy theorist. 2/
Shahbazi was a historian & analyst from a leftist background linked to the Islamic Republic's intelligence community & parastatal conglomerates and an antisemite & conspiracy theorist. 2/
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Caveat 2: The text below is mainly from this video but I've supplemented it with his complementary analysis going back to early 2025. 3/
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1. A Israeli regime-change war is certain
He and I agree that today its no longer controversial to say that-at least in the three years left in the second term of US President Donald Trump-Israel may launch a war with the goal of overthrowing the Islamic Republic system. 4/
He and I agree that today its no longer controversial to say that-at least in the three years left in the second term of US President Donald Trump-Israel may launch a war with the goal of overthrowing the Islamic Republic system. 4/
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But Shahbazi and I also concur that the 12-Day Iran-Israel War was NOT a regime-change war (or at least did not have regime change as a main goal).
Rather, he views the war as the first stage of a two-stage plan, and that a regime-change war would be conducted differently. 5/
Rather, he views the war as the first stage of a two-stage plan, and that a regime-change war would be conducted differently. 5/
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[Additionally, I think we should distinguish a regime-change war from an Israeli "campaign between wars", which would be aimed at maintaining the breathing space and military edge it won in the war, rather than seriously advancing regime change]. 6/ x.com/IranWonk/statu…
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Shahbazi, like me, also believes that the Islamic Republic has advanced a narrative of victory in the war to rally its base and re-attract fellow-travelers, but has ended up buying its own delusional propaganda. 7/
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He doesn't look favorably on the prospect of US negotiations with the Islamic Republic because he thinks Trump's conditions are tantamount to "surrender", and that accepting these conditions would lead to the disintegration of its elite and social base. 8/
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[I agree that these are the conditions the Islamic Republic faces today, but see the situation as somewhat more fluid, and Trump himself is also so unpredictable that I don't rule out successful negotiations quite as strongly as he does]. 9/
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2. Israel has deeply penetrated Iranian society
Shahbazi believes Israel has deeply penetrated Iran's state and society-to the point of understanding its psychology-and organized major forces inside the country. 10/
Shahbazi believes Israel has deeply penetrated Iran's state and society-to the point of understanding its psychology-and organized major forces inside the country. 10/
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He also thinks Iranian society is largely pro-Israel or at least not anti-Israel. He thinks this is a societal reaction to the Islamic Republic's official antisemitism and anti-Zionism, and further stems from a "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" mindset among many. 11/
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[I somewhat agree with him here, but I think given his background as an antisemite and conspiracy theorist, he might be overestimating Israel's insight and popularity, although I would agree Iranians are probably largely not anti-Israel or don't care about this issue]. 12/
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3. A mass uprising for regime-change is possible
(The Pahlavi movement is the dominant opposition)
Shahbazi sees a mass-uprising for regime-change-possibly directly or indirectly aided by Israel-as being quite possible. 13/
(The Pahlavi movement is the dominant opposition)
Shahbazi sees a mass-uprising for regime-change-possibly directly or indirectly aided by Israel-as being quite possible. 13/
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Critically, he views such a mass uprising as being Pro-Pahlavi, with the psychology of Iranian society today transforming and moving in the direction of what it views as being the exact opposite of the slogans and taboos of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 14/
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He views this "strange...but perhaps not so strange" phenomenon as being a function of the manifold failures of the Islamic Republic, and Iranians today hearing from their elders about a glorious past with a tinge of "regret" about what has transpired during and since 1979. 15/
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Shahbazi thinks that the rest of the Iranian opposition-Islamic Republic-linked "moderates" and radical reformists, MEK/Islamic-nationalists, leftists and social democrats, liberals, and republicans-lack the social base (at least until now) to seriously contest power. 16/
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He concludes that "this tendency [Pahlavi movement] is quite large in society" and that "IF" mass protests erupt we shall see a "wave" that no one-neither the Islamic Republic nor fragmented opposition-can resist. 17/
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[I've written extensively about my skepticism of a mass uprising-at least by itself-succeeding in overthrowing the Islamic Republic, a skepticism that goes back to 2009. But I take his point that conditions around a future uprising may be different.] 18/ x.com/IranWonk/statu…
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[On his view that the Pahlavi movement is the dominant political force-at least in the opposition-I tend to think this is true, with their power steadily growing since at least 2023, if not earlier, and have written about it here]. 19/ x.com/IranWonk/statu…
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Finally, Shahbazi sees the inter- and intra-factional opposition in-fighting (including within the Pahlavi movement) online and in the diaspora as a "political elite" phenomenon that has nothing to do with the majority in Iran. 20/
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[I generally agree, but he seems to be rather optimistic about social conditions, whereas I believe the anger, hate, and homicidal ideation as being more pervasive than he acknowledges and a real danger-a flashing red alarm]. 21/
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My goal in posting Shahbazi's analysis is not to promote the views of an Islamic Republic-linked antisemite and conspiracy theorist.
It's to say I'm seeing a non-mainstream socially, politically, and ideologically diverse group of analysts converge on similar conclusions...22/
It's to say I'm seeing a non-mainstream socially, politically, and ideologically diverse group of analysts converge on similar conclusions...22/
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...including around Iran's long-term civilizational peril (which has curiously elicited largely passive reactions), today's rapidly deteriorating conditions around state failure and war (v. status-quo narratives in the mainstream), and the Pahlavi movement's growing power...23
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...which may not ultimately materialize in Iran, and fizzle out in a few years, but as a readily observable socio-political phenomenon now is met with a wall of silence or denialism ("they don't exist", "they're just bots", "they're IRI agents", "they're far-right", etc.) 24/
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While more status-quo scenarios still remain likely, either the succession to a third Islamic Republic (moderating thermidor or further radicalization) or a hybrid regime (with continuities based on the security sector and oligarchical conglomerates)...25/
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...we must also be brutally realistic about the strange or extreme things that are happening before our eyes, and the possibility that what were once fringe scenarios might now have to be reassessed in a new light. 26/26