Mossad's "legion of defectors" in Iran 1. @jakesNYT had a great...
Farzan Sabet@IranWonk
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Jun 18, 2025
~5 min read
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Mossad's "legion of defectors" in Iran
1. @jakesNYT had a great piece in the NYT this weekend (with comments by yours truly) emphasizing the spectacular use of drones by #Ukraine and #Israel in highly damaging operations against their respective adversaries, #Russia and #Iran (article linked at the end).
I told her what was impressive for me was not necessarily the technology - Israel has deployed small drones in a similar capacity in Iran since at least the early-2020s - but the intelligence-operational element. The cases of both the Ukrainian and Israeli operations demonstrate a deep understanding of the human terrain in the territories' of their foes, with which they have been intimately familiar for decades if not longer. Other comparably sophisticated states lacking this familiarity may not have been able to execute similarly effective attacks.
The scale, precision, and effectiveness of the operations on the ground in Iran implied the existence of a comparatively large legion of defectors inside of Iran.
(Note: If we're using less analytical language, the overwhelming majority of Iranians would probably view them as traitors for the death and destruction they have wrought on the streets of the country).
2. This legion could have at least three main elements. The first would be Mossad controllers in Israel, and local Israeli handlers, perhaps Iranian Jews who have made Aliyah some time ago, but could blend into Iran's urban landscape.
The second element would be double-agents within the Islamic Republic system engaged in intelligence-gathering, since it's unlikely Israel's feats were accomplished by cyber or remote-means alone. These would likely be khodi ("system insiders") outwardly espousing a hardline worldview, while supporting intelligence and sabotage operations for Israel in secret. Such an individual could be a senior official all the way down to a janitor. These people would likely be induced to work for Israel due to the leveraging of kompromat against them, threats to the wellbeing of them or their family, financial inducements, promises of support for emigration, professional frustration, and/or ideological disillusionment.
The third element would be Iranian field operatives, who would establish the legion's infrastructure and conduct actions on the ground, including assassinations, sabotage, and feeding intelligence to the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to conduct strikes. These individuals would predominantly be gheyr khodi ("non-system insiders") of reasonability good ability, hailing from various backgrounds and worldviews. Such individuals would likely be induced to work for Israel due to anti-system sentiments, financial inducements, promises of support for emigration, or the leveraging of kompromat against them. Most of these people would have little prospect for entering and rising in the state system as "non-insiders", and were likely radicalized to take such drastic action beginning with the 2009 Green Movement protests, and through the socio-political and -economically motivated anti-system protests in 2018, 2019, and 2022.
This third group is likely to be predominantly be drawn from Iranians of the Persian- and Azerbaijani Shia urban core of the country (including groups like the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, a.k.a the MEK or MKO): Israel is unlikely to risk the lives and safety of the Iranian Jewish community, and individuals from Kurdish and Balochi groups would have a harder time blending in the urban core and could be known to the security services due to their past activities.
3. Every system and polity produces dissenters, malcontents, and traitors who turn against their government or people. But the creation of Mossad's legion of defectors has been enabled by the Islamic Republic's dual policies of external and internal tension, espousing confrontation with Israel (and the United States) abroad; and political polarization between "insiders" and "non-insiders" at home. The lethal combination of enmity with one of the world's leading security powers (i.e. Israel, backed by the world's superpower the United States), and polarization and radicalization of vast swaths of the Iranian public, has created fertile ground for discontent to be weaponized into deadly and effective operations that undermine the security of the state.
This problem is not new, and the Islamic Republic has grappled with it for decades. Instead of placing its laser focus on such high-level threats and creating the conditions to neutralize them, the post-revolution Iranian state has spent an inordinate amount of resources and energy policing the minute details of its citizens lives, and punishing and humiliating them for the smallest actions that would go unnoticed in a free society.
And so, the issue has festered and grown steadily worse in scale and magnitude over time, culminating in the scenes of mayhem and destruction we've seen on the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities. The Iranian security forces appear to have rolled up some units of the legion, but many remain at large, continuing to provide Mossad (and by extension the IAF) intelligence for air strikes, conduct drone attacks, and set off car bombs.
Iran's security has been punctured, people's already fraying sense of normalcy shattered, and the Islamic Republic's security services - the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) chief among them - have been left discredited on this and other fronts.
Breaking the ranks of the Mossad's legion of defectors, and the conditions that created it, will require a fundamental change in the orientation of the system in Iran, or the system itself.
Have I correctly understood and characterized the nature and structure of Mossad's legion of defectors? What part of the picture am I missing? Happy to engage with thoughtful responses!
New York Times article by Lara Jakes with my input: nytimes.com/2025/06/14/wor…
1. @jakesNYT had a great piece in the NYT this weekend (with comments by yours truly) emphasizing the spectacular use of drones by #Ukraine and #Israel in highly damaging operations against their respective adversaries, #Russia and #Iran (article linked at the end).
I told her what was impressive for me was not necessarily the technology - Israel has deployed small drones in a similar capacity in Iran since at least the early-2020s - but the intelligence-operational element. The cases of both the Ukrainian and Israeli operations demonstrate a deep understanding of the human terrain in the territories' of their foes, with which they have been intimately familiar for decades if not longer. Other comparably sophisticated states lacking this familiarity may not have been able to execute similarly effective attacks.
The scale, precision, and effectiveness of the operations on the ground in Iran implied the existence of a comparatively large legion of defectors inside of Iran.
(Note: If we're using less analytical language, the overwhelming majority of Iranians would probably view them as traitors for the death and destruction they have wrought on the streets of the country).
2. This legion could have at least three main elements. The first would be Mossad controllers in Israel, and local Israeli handlers, perhaps Iranian Jews who have made Aliyah some time ago, but could blend into Iran's urban landscape.
The second element would be double-agents within the Islamic Republic system engaged in intelligence-gathering, since it's unlikely Israel's feats were accomplished by cyber or remote-means alone. These would likely be khodi ("system insiders") outwardly espousing a hardline worldview, while supporting intelligence and sabotage operations for Israel in secret. Such an individual could be a senior official all the way down to a janitor. These people would likely be induced to work for Israel due to the leveraging of kompromat against them, threats to the wellbeing of them or their family, financial inducements, promises of support for emigration, professional frustration, and/or ideological disillusionment.
The third element would be Iranian field operatives, who would establish the legion's infrastructure and conduct actions on the ground, including assassinations, sabotage, and feeding intelligence to the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to conduct strikes. These individuals would predominantly be gheyr khodi ("non-system insiders") of reasonability good ability, hailing from various backgrounds and worldviews. Such individuals would likely be induced to work for Israel due to anti-system sentiments, financial inducements, promises of support for emigration, or the leveraging of kompromat against them. Most of these people would have little prospect for entering and rising in the state system as "non-insiders", and were likely radicalized to take such drastic action beginning with the 2009 Green Movement protests, and through the socio-political and -economically motivated anti-system protests in 2018, 2019, and 2022.
This third group is likely to be predominantly be drawn from Iranians of the Persian- and Azerbaijani Shia urban core of the country (including groups like the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, a.k.a the MEK or MKO): Israel is unlikely to risk the lives and safety of the Iranian Jewish community, and individuals from Kurdish and Balochi groups would have a harder time blending in the urban core and could be known to the security services due to their past activities.
3. Every system and polity produces dissenters, malcontents, and traitors who turn against their government or people. But the creation of Mossad's legion of defectors has been enabled by the Islamic Republic's dual policies of external and internal tension, espousing confrontation with Israel (and the United States) abroad; and political polarization between "insiders" and "non-insiders" at home. The lethal combination of enmity with one of the world's leading security powers (i.e. Israel, backed by the world's superpower the United States), and polarization and radicalization of vast swaths of the Iranian public, has created fertile ground for discontent to be weaponized into deadly and effective operations that undermine the security of the state.
This problem is not new, and the Islamic Republic has grappled with it for decades. Instead of placing its laser focus on such high-level threats and creating the conditions to neutralize them, the post-revolution Iranian state has spent an inordinate amount of resources and energy policing the minute details of its citizens lives, and punishing and humiliating them for the smallest actions that would go unnoticed in a free society.
And so, the issue has festered and grown steadily worse in scale and magnitude over time, culminating in the scenes of mayhem and destruction we've seen on the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities. The Iranian security forces appear to have rolled up some units of the legion, but many remain at large, continuing to provide Mossad (and by extension the IAF) intelligence for air strikes, conduct drone attacks, and set off car bombs.
Iran's security has been punctured, people's already fraying sense of normalcy shattered, and the Islamic Republic's security services - the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) chief among them - have been left discredited on this and other fronts.
Breaking the ranks of the Mossad's legion of defectors, and the conditions that created it, will require a fundamental change in the orientation of the system in Iran, or the system itself.
Have I correctly understood and characterized the nature and structure of Mossad's legion of defectors? What part of the picture am I missing? Happy to engage with thoughtful responses!
New York Times article by Lara Jakes with my input: nytimes.com/2025/06/14/wor…