Not much has been achieved in Abu Dhabi, but the framing of the...

1. The U.S. – clearly Kushner and Witkoff, with Trump’s blessing – wants to bring about not only peace for peace’s sake, but also an opening for business deals with Russia. They probably want a credible excuse for opening a business track with Russia. After the midterms, securing business opportunities for family members and friends might be one of their goals. And here Europe might be an obstacle to remove – EU sanctions will prevent the launch of some envisaged U.S.-Russian business ventures, such as gas deliveries to Europe.
It is probably beyond Kushner and Witkoff’s comprehension what Putin really wants. They do not understand Russian thinking or the implications of concessions to Moscow for European security. They have no understanding of Russia’s goals and policies towards NATO, the EU and within the OSCE, either now or in the past.
Kushner during the press conference: “Something is clearly not working…”.
They say they want to preserve existing institutions and make NATO stronger, at the same time as Russia wants to undermine them. It is good that Gen. Grynkewich took part in the talks, providing a link to the realities on the ground. And these realities include – according to the Polish Defence Minister – the Pentagon agreeing today to station troops permanently in Poland and not objecting to Poland acquiring land-based Tomahawk missiles.
2. The Europeans – are being drawn into a tricky game. Ukraine wants Europe on board in order to secure European backing in its difficult talks with the U.S. Europe wants to know what the U.S. is discussing with Russia regarding the end of the war and post-war Ukraine, and for all the right reasons. The problem is that both Russia and Kushner/Witkoff have just sprung a trap by opening up discussions on post-war European security with the Europeans. And this trap carries two major risks.
First, it broadens the scope of the discourse. Once the topic has been opened and the Europeans have been drawn in, Russia and the U.S. will push Europe further towards engaging in these talks, with an unpredictable outcome.
Second, Europe has the problem of not being a single entity, of having differing perspectives and representatives, some of whom – in the race to “represent Europe” – might be more willing to go beyond previously agreed common positions.
All in all, I hope there is enough sense within the E4, EU and NATO to understand where this is heading, as Russia is unlikely to shift its positions.
“According to Merz’s spokesperson, Kornelius, the Europeans and the United States have “agreed on four principles” in Abu Dhabi (although not yet with Russia):
“First, on sequencing: the sequencing envisages that discussions will first focus on peace in Ukraine and subsequently on an order that could prevail in Europe and the transatlantic – Euro-Atlantic – space.
Second, on the context of the negotiations: this means that the negotiations will not focus exclusively on this architecture as a single issue; rather, Ukraine is an inherent part of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. This means that there will be a great many sub-issues to consider and negotiate. Efforts will be made to address these in working groups. These will concern questions of security guarantees and treaty-based assurances.
The third principle agreed upon is consensus. Consensus means that any agreement will have to be endorsed by all members. If consensus cannot be reached among NATO members, these arrangements cannot be implemented either. Consensus is therefore also a fundamental element for the American side.
The fourth principle is summed up in the term ‘no-surprise policy’, meaning no surprises. This means that Europe and the United States have agreed to develop a common understanding under which these negotiations will now continue without side deals, with the necessary transparency and in close coordination.””

„Erstens, über die Sequenzierung: Die Sequenzierung sieht vor, dass zuerst über den Frieden in der Ukraine diskutiert wird und anschließend über eine Ordnung, die in Europa und im transatlantisch-euroatlantischen Raum herrschen kann.
Zweitens, über den Kontext der Verhandlungen: Der Kontext bedeutet, Verhandlungen werden nicht monothematisch über diese Architektur geführt, sondern die Ukraine ist inhärenter Teil der euroatlantischen Sicherheitsarchitektur. Das heißt, es wird dann sehr, sehr viele Unteraspekte zu betrachten und zu verhandeln geben. Das wird man in Arbeitsgruppen versuchen zu erreichen. Dabei geht es um Fragen der Sicherheitsgarantien und um Fragen der vertraglichen Sicherheiten.
Das dritte Prinzip, auf das sich geeinigt wurde, ist Konsens. Konsens bedeutet: Jede Vereinbarung wird nur von allen Mitgliedern getragen werden. Sobald kein Konsens unter den NATO-Mitgliedern erreicht werden kann, können diese Verabredungen auch nicht umgesetzt werden. Konsens ist also auch für die amerikanische Seite ein tragendes Element.
Das vierte Prinzip ist umschrieben mit einem Begriff, einer „no-surprise-policy“, also keine Überraschungen. Das heißt, es gibt die Verabredung zwischen Europa und den USA, ein gemeinsames Verständnis zu entwickeln, wonach diese Verhandlungen jetzt ohne Nebenabreden, mit der nötigen Transparenz und in enger Abstimmung fortgeführt werden.“