Ibn Taymiyya’s account of quiddity and preparatory contingency ia...

Ibn Taymiyya’s account of quiddity and preparatory contingency ia an amalgamation of Stoic-epicritic and Aristotelian elements, in which the contingent being is already present as prime matter. God’s causation, on this account, depends upon a series of spontaneously and

temporally originated contingents. This includes not only the matter and the conditions underlying the thing’s possibility, but also God’s power and will insofar as they are themselves temporally conditioned and contingent and caused.

The causal structure is therefore reciprocal and temporally extended: the contingency of the thing depends upon its causal external and intermediary conditions, while those conditions are themselves dependent upon further temporally originated conditions.

If this model is to be granted, then God is not a creator and his necessity has no leverage over the “contingency” of what is contingent neither does he possess agency over them and in my opinion Ibn Taymiya selected the worse positions from each group and adopted it.