Operationally, Epic Fury has been a success, but not without fault....

1

Operationally, Epic Fury has been a success, but not without fault. Losses incurred by US & partner forces could have been minimized had the Trump Admin been more open to Ukrainian support; and the US Army more nimble in reforms.

Here are the receipts to prove it. 🧵 ⬇️

1/25

2

Last August the Ukrainians pitched the White House on a defense industrial cooperation deal focused on Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (cUAS). Ukraine has immense technical and operational expertise in this area. They made this presentation, obtained by Axios.

2/25

3

Ukraine even emphasized the threat Iran posed to US forces in CENTCOM. After meeting with Zelensky, Trump told his team to work on it, but they did not follow through. US officials have told Axios that this was a big mistake on the Administration's part.

3/25

                            4
                        
Another US official told Axios that US military personnel have "been wanting to go to Ukraine and pull the tech and the tactics from [them] ... so that we're innovating and learning."

If you don't believe it, just listen to the US military themselves, here's LG Whitney:

4/25

                            5
                        
Here's then EUCOM Commander General Cavoli testifying that he initially doubted the Ukrainians ability to use PATRIOT, but they have become so proficient with it that the US Army is now learning from them.

5/25

                            6
                        
Here's Colonel Rosanna Clemente, an Air Defense Artillery (ADA) officer with 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, which is subordinate to EUCOM, stating that the Ukrainians are "some of the best air defenders I've ever seen" both in SHORAD & HIMAD.

6/25

                            7
                        
BG Curtis King, commandant of the ADA School explains how Ukraine & Russia are using UAS to target air defense systems, and that's "something we haven't talked about a lot that I need to make sure this group understands, we've got to look at our survivability against UAS."

7/25

                            8
                        
"One of the things we'd heard [...] with the Ukrainians recently was: when do you learn *not* to shoot."

"It pertains directly to our survivability, of our soldiers, our systems, and of our interceptors, to ensure that we have the magazine depth that we need."

8/25

                            9
                        
This is a crucial point. ADA units must conduct their engagements prudently to preserve interceptors; both to maintain self defense against further imminent threats, and the overall depth of the stockpile for all units. You don't want to be baited into Winchester.

9/25

                            10
                        
Col. William Parker, Air & Missile Defense-CFT: "What we are observing in Ukraine is I emit, I get targeted, I die." He explains that the solution to this is staying mobile. Assets left stationary for too long, especially while emitting signals, will be destroyed.

10/25

                            11
                        
Observation from Ukraine: "This Group 1, Group 2 [UAS] threat is everywhere. So how do we provide at the Brigade & below capability that's Military Occupational Specialty agnostic that anybody can employ?"

Meaning how do non-ADA units protect themselves from small UAS?

11/25

12

"We're going to have to make it simple, cost effective; use platforms and weapons that are already resident within unit motor pools and arms rooms; think .50 cal and M240 machine guns."

"Give them the capability to detect, orient to the threat and defeat it."

12/25

13

The absence of adequate cUAS capabilities for US forces at Shuaiba Port in Kuwait resulted in the death of 6 service members. The Army knew this was a vulnerability, but progress on implementing these needed reforms has been slow. The consequences are now very real.

13/25

14

The Ukrainians knew too, of course. Again, they proposed a comprehensive plan to the Admin in August, that would have provided protection to US & partner forces, and civilian infrastructure as well.

US officials arrogantly dismissed Zelensky as a "self-promoter" though.

14/25

15

It's important to emphasize that Ukraine's proposal and the broader lessons to be learned go far beyond interceptors and active defense measures too. Air & missile defense begins with passive defense: dispersal, camouflage, and physical protection of assets are all key.

15/25

16

Many of the proven Ukrainian tactics, techniques and procedures have yet to be implemented across the US military, despite an understanding of their merits. Much of this doesn't apply to just air defense. Non ADA units need to understand how to protect themselves too.

16/25

17

Target hardening takes many forms, and does not receive sufficient attention. I reiterate, US forces in CENTCOM are finding this out the hard way. The entire Joint Force needs to be be internalizing this. Air defense is now everyone's responsibility, not just ADA.

17/25

18

They are scrambling to find contractors that can deliver them bunkers on short notice. The Ukrainians could have done all of this for them last year, before the operation began. The Trump Admin knew that no matter what course of action they chose, Iran would be a threat.

18/25
x.com/16716184417767…

                            19
                        
I want to emphasize that the overall performance of US & allied forces has been quite good, particularly in the realm of ballistic missile defense. Critically examining the known shortcomings is essential though, if future mistakes are to be avoided.

19/25

20

The unprecedented success of the joint air campaign has prevented Iran from capitalizing on the shortcomings in the coalition's defensive posture. In a scenario against a peer or near peer adversary, things would look very different. Air superiority isn't a given.

20/25

                            21
                        
For policymakers, one of the most important lessons from Epic Fury is the limitations and purpose of Air & Missile Defense (AMD), and how this applies to Ukraine. Western leaders have viewed AMD as end rather than a means to an end: destroying enemy offensive power.

21/25

22

If the US & Israel had to fight Iran like Ukraine has to fight Russia, with limited ability to retaliate against incoming attacks, they would not perform much better. Ukraine invests heavily in defending their skies because they have to, but this can't win them the war.

22/25

                            23
                        
They are forced to play this game because since the outset of the war, the US & Europe have refused to take serious steps to equip Ukraine with long range strike capabilities to even the scales against Russia. This is a political will problem, not a capacity problem.

23/25

24

To come full circle, President Zelensky has offered the US — and now other countries too — mutually beneficial partnerships. Ukraine has unprecedented expertise in AMD, and cost effective cUAS in particular. In exchange, they need financing and long range missiles.

24/25

25

The Trump Admin should have taken Ukraine up on their offer in August, but the next best time is today. With the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund now making its first investment — in UAS software too — it should be clear that more cooperation is needed, not less.

25/25

                            26
                        
If you found this thread informative, and are interested in learning more about the War in Ukraine, check out @Tochnyi. It's an organization that I'm a member of that does amazing research, particularly on the topic of unmanned systems, long range strikes and air defense.

27

Exciting things coming soon: tochnyi.info

Operationally, Epic Fury has been a success, but not without fault....

Actions

What You Can Do

Actions

What You Can Do

More in Sports