🇫🇷 I underestimated the French. Macron's nuclear speech includes a...
Darya Dolzikova@DDolzikova
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Mar 04, 2026
~3 min read
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🇫🇷 I underestimated the French.
Macron's nuclear speech includes a number of significant changes to French nuclear policy, some of which I had raised as a possibility in a recent paper on nuclear deterrence in Europe but judged to likely be too forward leaning. I was wrong.
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Macron's nuclear speech includes a number of significant changes to French nuclear policy, some of which I had raised as a possibility in a recent paper on nuclear deterrence in Europe but judged to likely be too forward leaning. I was wrong.
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RUSI@RUSI_org
In our new paper, @DDolzikova examines how nuclear deterrence in Europe is being reshaped by persistent threats of Russian aggression, uncertainty over US commitments, and growing strategic competition. rusi.org/explore-our-re…
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Notable changes:
- Increase in warhead numbers
- End to transparency on warhead numbers
- Extension of French nuclear exercises outside French territory and participation of allies
- Option for forward-deploying French strategic (see: nuclear-capable) air assets across Europe
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- Increase in warhead numbers
- End to transparency on warhead numbers
- Extension of French nuclear exercises outside French territory and participation of allies
- Option for forward-deploying French strategic (see: nuclear-capable) air assets across Europe
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Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark to take part in this 'dissuasion avancée' (forward deterrence?) effort, with closer cooperation on nuclear issues.
But (for the avoidance of any doubt) ultimate nuclear decision-making remains with the President.
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But (for the avoidance of any doubt) ultimate nuclear decision-making remains with the President.
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Some initial observations/reactions.
Macron mentions increase in warhead numbers in the context of needing to maintain ability to credibly hold at risk adversary assets...
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Macron mentions increase in warhead numbers in the context of needing to maintain ability to credibly hold at risk adversary assets...
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Concerns over current numbers not being enough likely not driven by any assumption of an increase in Russian strategic targets, as France's nuclear arsenal won't increase enough to adopt a meaningful damage limitation strategy. A more logical explanation...
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...given France's counter-value targeting approach, is possible growing concern over ability to penetrate improvements in Russian IAMD and maintain ability to hold at risk Russian centres of power. See: the upgrading of the ABM system around Moscow and deployment of S-500.
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It's also possible that forward deploying dual-capable aircraft may require production of additional numbers of warheads. However, if aircraft are not forward based permanently but only deployed outside France in crisis situations, greater warhead numbers may not be needed.
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On the forward deployment of FAS. I have previously questioned the assurance value of increasing the role of non-nuclear allies in the épaulement role for the French deterrent. It provides no guarantee that the French would use nuclear weapons in allies' defence. However...
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The option of forward deploying FAS, alongside greater involvement of allied conventional capabilities in French nuclear planning and exercises offers concrete assurance value to allies. Both as a political signal of French commitment to the security of allies but also...
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because it increases entrapment risks for the French. Forward-deployed nuclear-capable delivery systems will be targeted early in case of an outbreak of armed conflict with Russia, pulling the French in.
This is precisely why France is much better-placed than the UK to...
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This is precisely why France is much better-placed than the UK to...
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meaningfully strengthen assurance signalling to allies. Despite the commitment of the UK's deterrent to NATO and the deployment of our Vanguard SSBNs, our submarines cannot be demonstrably 'forward-based' for signalling in the same way as an air-based nuclear deterrent.
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However, as I have argued, deterrence value of forward-based French strategic systems will ultimately be limited without additional investments in advanced conventional systems (IAMD, DPS). Macron’s speech made clear expectation that non-nuclear allies
contribute on this.
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contribute on this.
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Some allies will remain dissatisfied by the lack of ability to input into decision-making on nuclear use. Germany will almost certainly have been pushing for more. But joint decision-making was never going to be on the table. This is an already impressive move by the French.
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As an aside: Greece already flies Rafales. I wonder if it may be possible/of interest to convert some of these to be dual-capable. That would, however, presumably result in a permanent forward-based presence of dual-capable systems which seems to explicitly not be the intent
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As always, for anything on French nuclear deterrence and strategic thinking, see also @HFayet and @Etienne_Marcuz