ECB's #RatesCancelCulture, France’s Spending Profligacy, and...

Over the years I have repeatedly argued that the ECB’s excessively prolonged interventions to control long-end yields of key Eurozone sovereign debt sowed the seeds 1/

Take Italy.
Based on ECB Data, the unreal conclusion's that IT Debt Supply's actually been negative from Dec.'15 on, now @ - 368bn Eur once PSPP (Principal + Reinvestments), PEPP (Principal) are accounted for.
@INArteCarloDoss
Not only did 4/
It was then – chart 3 – that market pressure brought some belated discipline to Italy’s crony-spending habitus, leading to the “savvy” no-spend/no-growth approach adopted by the Meloni government (from 2022 onward), bolstered 6/
The political tremors shaking today’s France are rooted in a long-standing lack of 7/
And yet this is still not enough. The baseline for euro-area yields is now much higher, as the “Re-arm EU” plan and structural delays in growth-oriented 11/
Fiscal consolidation is for sunny days: making hay while the sun shines to prepare for winter. And winter is now, even if Europeans /12
@gianlucac1bis @HannoLustig @jeuasommenulle @INArteCarloDoss @albertobisin @HayekAndKeynes @ThManfredi @CarloStagnaro @micheleboldrin @VeroDeRomanis @helentbiz @TwainsMustache @komileva @patrick_saner @SirOfFinance @ericlchaney
Per il lavoro sulla Francia che hai redatto forse questi miei dati ti suoneranno utili.
🫂


