Thread🧵 1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming...

Thread🧵

1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.

2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.

3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war

4/ Though Russia managed to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast in the winter - like I anticipated, progress in Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar has been much slower. At this rate, major battles for large cities like Zaporizhzhia are looking increasingly problematic for Russia.

5/ For Ukraine, the situation is far from ideal. The threat of a full US cutoff, bad recruitment numbers, potential easing of sanctions on Russia, growing foreign efforts to destabilize Ukraine politically, and mounting internal challenges all contribute to a worrying outlook.

6/ Even without the US, the efforts to resolve the war diplomatically are likely to continue as both sides face mounting pressures. Neither side is close to achieving a strategic victory, though Russia’s position has improved with the new White House administration.

7/ If no major changes occur, this phase of the war may end in a draw - one where neither side achieves its strategic objectives. Russia may retain control over certain Ukrainian regions - a modest reward, but one that leaves the door open to potentially finishing the job later