Rusia invade Ucrania Día 328 Año 3 (3.985) Ucrania invade Rusia Día...

@TuiteroMartin
Martin Tuitero@TuiteroMartin
53 views Jan 17, 2025 ~3 min read
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Rusia invade Ucrania Día 328 Año 3 (3.985) Ucrania invade Rusia Día 165 Hilo ⬇️
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Han pasado 2 años.

@TuiteroMartin
Martin Tuitero@TuiteroMartin
1. Marynka tras 10 meses de bombardeos. No queda nada. Ya es Aleppo.
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Ha pasado 1 año.

@TuiteroMartin
Martin Tuitero@TuiteroMartin
4. Vodyane, S Avdiivka, los ataques rusos. 1 año entre ambas imágenes, no han avanzado ni 1 kilómetro y no será que no lo han intentado porque la chatarrería ha crecido y mucho. La suerte de los ucranianos, la pvta casualidad.
x.com/UAWeapons/stat…
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1. Han pasado 34 años. Tal día como hoy en 1991, comenzó la campaña aérea de la guerra más exitosa del siglo XX, Tormenta del desierto, y su éxito se basó en la campaña aérea más eficaz que el mundo ha conocido jamás. Que a veces se nos olvida cuando vemos a Rusia en modo 1917.
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1/1. Han tenido que pasar 3 años y ver a Rusia en Ladas y Bukhankas para que los profetas del multi-brigade-level y la guerra de armas combinadas se pongan a ensalzar las virtudes de la infantería ligera y los asaltos a pie. Qué dirían si fuera Ucrania.
@Black_BirdGroup
Black Bird Group@Black_BirdGroup
Why does this matter?

Reports of North Korean troops in Kursk often mention “human wave” tactics. This narrative oversimplifies what’s likely happening: They’re employing basic, scalable infantry drills. These are rooted in fire and movement, not mindless rushing.

14/
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1/2. Solo ahora, cuando Rusia ha perdido 600 tanques y 1300 blindados en el saliente Avdiivka-Pokrovsk tras 15 meses de cargas blindadas, vienen a cantar las bondades de la infantería en lugar de reconocer el éxito de la defensa ucraniana. Lo de siempre.

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@naalsio26
Naalsio@naalsio26
Pokrovsk Raion offensive equipment loss numbers as of 13 January 2025.

In summary:
2199 Russian 🇷🇺 losses (+57) vs. 600 Ukrainian 🇺🇦 losses (+93)

Note that abandoned Russian equipment with no damage and no further footage or satellite confirmation after over a year has been removed from the count.

Spreadsheet showing the losses in detail: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d…
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1/3. Pensamiento parche. Donde Rusia emplea unidades recién equipadas, Kursk, siguen las cargas blindadas. Su problema es olvidar que blindados y fuerza aérea son la misma ecuación desde 1917. Tormenta en el desierto llevó esa ecuación a su cénit en 1991.

@kriegsforscherD
kriegsforscher@kriegsforscherD
❗️Russian AFV losses in Kursk oblast. Part II
A lot of Russian AFV were destroyed by my company🫡

We continue fighting in Kursk and we need your help for our big birds: batteries.

The sum is 6000$:
PP: osint4ua@gmail.com

Another way to help us:
secure.wayforpay.com/donate/dcd1b82…

🧵
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1/4. Este constante mover la portería es la consecuencia de no querer aceptar el inmenso fracaso de los que iban a tomar Kiev en 3 días y el inmenso esfuerzo de los que llevan 3 años colapsando cada mes. La retaguardia rusa cuenta la verdadera historia.
3:14
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2. BMP-Transit.
0:28
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3. RUs Tlgram Voin_dv reconoce que siguen los combates en Vremivka, W Velyka Novosilka. Allí opera, desde el río en dirección W 1Bon/110Brig Mec UKR, el 453Bon Independiente y 3Bon/141Brig UKR.

t.me/voin_dv/12829

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@TuiteroMartin
Martin Tuitero@TuiteroMartin
10. Fuegos relacionados con combates/combates en Vremivka, W Velyka Novosilka. Not good. Very bad.
x.com/tom_bike/statu…
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4. Vídeo ruso, MT-LB y Roshel Senator abandonados UKR son alcanzados por drones rusos. Para Geoloc. Única referencia "Donbas".
t.me/rosgvardia67/4…
0:52
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5. Rusos decapitan a 2 soldados ucranianos capturados y publican el video. La barbarie. Contra esto lucha Ucrania. x.com/TuiteroMartin/…
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5/1. No son solo los que decapitan. Las reacciones del Grupo de Tlgrm ruso en el que se ha publicado el vídeo.
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6. Viene de Tuit 3, bandera rusa junto riv Mokri Yaly, Vremivka, W Velyka Novosilka, Geoloc o de @Bielitzling


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@Bielitzling
Bielitz@Bielitzling
Russian soldiers raise their flag in Vremivka, Donetsk Oblast
@GeoConfirmed @UAControlMap
47.839147, 36.821228
source: t.me/voin_dv/12840
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7. Estamos ya en los BTR-70.
x.com/LXSummer1/stat…
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8. Dar'ino, Kursk, Rusia, ya no existe.
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9. Losers flock together.
0:43
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10. Van a necesitar 3 Bukhankas.
t.me/Tsaplienko/673…
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11. BAT-2 ruso destruido mientras intentaba preparar un cruce sobre el canal, Kalinina, N Chasiv Yar. La chatarrería que lo rodea son los restos de lo que llevan intentando desde Abr-2024.
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11/1. Video destrucción BAT-2 ruso junto al canal, Kalinina, N Chasiv Yar.
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11/2. Misma geoloc, Ag-2024.

@moklasen
imi (m)@moklasen
Chasiv Yar
AFU 21st Mechanized Brigade
RU bikers attempted to gain a foothold at the canal pumping station
t.me/sarmat21ompb3/…
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11/3. Es que imagina que alguien siga vendiendo colapsos y calderos cuando los rusos llevan 5 meses, desde Agosto, intentando montar una zona de paso para sus blindados en el mismo punto N Chasiv Yar, la ciudad que iban a tomar en Mayo.
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12. Una de mis debilidades son los mapas rusos, como este, Sector Pokrovsk, SW. Lo interesante va a ser comprobar si avanzan hacia Pokrovsk, se dirigen N para cortar la E50 o siguen W hacia los límites del Oblast de Donetsk.
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13. Es difícil imaginar cómo pasan estas cosas.
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14. "Incluso con los recursos disponibles, no habrá una defensa resistente sin comprender los conceptos básicos de cómo organizarla y construirla (en otras palabras, DÓNDE Y CÓMO cavar)."

@D_Redis
Denys Prokopenko@D_Redis
Recently, there has been a lot of speculation regarding the topic of defense line fortifications:

"The money is being stolen!"
"There is no equipment!"
"We’re lacking resources!"
"We’re lacking people!"

What we are truly lacking are brains and skills.

Over the past year, our brigade had to carry out stabilization actions in the Lyman and Toretsk sectors. In three instances, we crushed the enemy, forcing them to lose their initiative and offensive capabilities. We halted the enemy's advance into our defenses (even in areas with unprepared positions). Afterward, we created enabling conditions: we counterattacked and liberated the previously occupied territories.

Of course, there are sections of the frontline where everyone is sitting on their hands. There are also cases where soldiers are forced to take up defense in "litterbox" positions, which leaves them no chance of avoiding injury within hours (and I am not even talking about evacuation). Afterward, we hear pompous reports about the "lack of people". Although the needed strongpoint was dug and covered a long time ago in the neighboring tree line, now we "lack people".
In fact, that is not the core issue. Three times, when taking over a defense area, we found that the problem was far deeper and more complex than simply a shortage of manpower or technical resources.

In one of the cases, we replaced a mix of "stillborn brigade"-type units. They had been subjected to linear assaults by VDV regiments with powerful artillery support (FPV drones and drone-dropped munitions were not as mainstream at that time). In this situation, I would just recommend not to form brigades like that anymore.

In the second case, I literally advised one of the brigade commanders to backfill the nonsensical strongpoints, but he would not listen. Soon after, the positions were lost and became excellent cover for the enemy.

In the third case, there was no defense SYSTEM in place as such.

That was back in 2023–2024. Now, it seems like we have the equipment, the resources, and even hire construction companies. But something is still going wrong! So what is the problem?!

The answer is simple. The officers stopped thinking. Either they were never taught how to think or were "thought for" by people who never bother to conduct reconnaissance of terrain within a cannon shot range from the defense line!

Even with resources available, there will be no resilient defense without understanding the basics of how to organize and construct it (in other words, WHERE AND HOW to dig). Soon, the enemy will turn those resources to ashes and they will not serve their purpose in protecting and saving the lives of our personnel, while the imaginary defense line will turn into an open house.

I would be happy to welcome proactive officers and personally hold instructional and methodological classes on defense line fortifications and organization of defensive combat based on our own examples.

Your people depend on you, and there is nothing to be ashamed of. Contact me via direct messages.
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15. "Lo que han hecho es un suicidio militar. Esto es la tumba de Rusia". Primera semana de guerra. @JuanMoraSoria

@JuanMoraSoria
Juan Mora 🇪🇺🦝🇺🇦@JuanMoraSoria
Retuiteo esto con la fecha, marzo de 2022, para que no se den confusiones youtu.be/A0s_gUgMjA0?si…
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16. Rusia arde: Ludinovo, Kaluga.
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16/1. Geoloc POV de @Dominik, depósitos combustible alcanzados en Ludinivo, Kaluga, Rusia.


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@99Dominik_
Dominik@99Dominik_
@GirkinGirkin Point of view - 53.854771, 34.458809
Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, Russia
@GeoConfirmed
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