𝐃𝐨𝐞𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐞𝐱𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐆𝐨𝐝 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐜𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐬 𝐢𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐲 𝐚 𝐠𝐞𝐧𝐮𝐢𝐧𝐞 𝐬𝐢𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲...

𝐃𝐨𝐞𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐞𝐱𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐆𝐨𝐝 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐜𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐬 𝐢𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐲 𝐚 𝐠𝐞𝐧𝐮𝐢𝐧𝐞 𝐬𝐢𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐆𝐨𝐝 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐜𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐬, 𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐐𝐮𝐫’ā𝐧𝐢𝐜 𝐦𝐚𝐱𝐢𝐦 𝐢𝐧 [𝟒𝟐:𝟏𝟏], ‘𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐞 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐥𝐢𝐤𝐞 𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐨 𝐡𝐢𝐦’?

The argument may be formalised as follows;
1) It is not the case that there is a genuine similarity relation between God and creatures. (Qur’ānic maxim, Assumed for reductio)
2) If a term x is predicated of y and z with a common meaning, — then x establishes a genuine similarity relation between y and z.
3) Existence is a term predicated of God and creatures with a common meaning.
4) Therefore, — existence establishes a genuine similarity relation between God and creatures. (MP 2,3)
5) Contradiction: It is the case that there is a genuine similarity relation between God and creatures, — and it is not the case that there is a genuine similarity relation between God and creatures. (Conjunction 1,4)

(1) & (3) are true, (4) & (5) are logical consequences, — so the conditional (2) is problematic.

First we must explain some terms. A term is said to be predicated 'univocally', — if it used in different contexts with exactly the same meaning, 'equivocally', — when it is used in different contexts with exactly different meanings, 'analogically', — in between these 2 extremes. Regarding univocal & analogical predication, both have some common meaning, but it is only the former, where the term predicated functions as a genus, that entails a genuine similarity relation between the subjects predicated of it. For somethings to be in a similarity relation, they must belong to the same proper genus, a genus is a category that includes a set of species, — & for something to be a genus, it must contribute to the intrinsic definition of its species.

The problem with (2) is that properly speaking, 'existence' is not a genus & is not predicated of existents univocally, — however it is analogically, the eminent Shaykh Ibn Sīnā explains;

"If one renders existence specific, then the existence of each thing is different. Just as the specific substance of each thing is different. This however does not prevent its being the case that there is a universal substancehood, in whose meaning all things agree (muttafaq), or that there is a generic (ʿāmm) existence in whose meaning all things agree."

📕— Avicenna, Dānishnāma, Ilāhiyyāt, 37–38.10, [On specific and general existence]

"Genus is indeed among the notions (maʿānī) similar to plane figure, through which an entity becomes an entity and a quiddity becomes a quiddity. Existence, by contrast, is something that attaches to quiddity, sometimes in concrete individuals and sometimes in the mind. Hence, it is clear that the term “existent” does not apply to the ten categories univocally (bi-al-tawāṭuʿ), and that even if it did apply univocally it would not be among the items that constitute the quiddity [i.e. it would not be a genus]. Therefore, existence is not a genus."

📕— Avicenna, Shifāʾ, Maqūlāt 62.2, [existence is not a genus, because one can grasp the quiddity while doubting existence]

In the first quote, — the Shaykh explains, that existence, notionally considered (mafhūm al-wujūd), is said of all things with the same meaning, as existence as a concept, — is universal and applies equally to all existents, however, existence in re, — that is, in particular existents, is different, and specific to them, not shared. The reason being that, (from the second quote), existence is not a proper genus, — because a genus must signify something intrinsic to the quiddities of its species, existence, by contrast, is something that attaches to quiddities as a concomitant, — it can be present or absent without altering the quiddity itself. Therefore, — the term "existence" does not function like a genus, which contributes to the constitution of a thing's quiddity. Hence, (2) does not follow.

In summary, existence is not something common to 'existents', properly speaking, as existence is not a proper genus, — to say 'x exists' and 'y exists' does not establish a genuine similarity relation between x and y, as all this means is x and y instantiate the concept of existence, and it is with respect to this notion (mafhum), — that existence is said to be 'predicated of existents' with the same meaning, whereas x and y, — qua particular existents, each have a different existence specific to themselves, and it is with respect to this, that existence is said to be 'predicated of existents analogically'.

There are some incorrect views regarding this issue;
1) If God exists, and creatures exist, and they're dissimilar, God must transcend existence.
2) If God exists and creatures exist, and they're dissimilar, God must be the only existent.
3) If God exists, and creatures exist, and they're dissimilar, existence must be predicated of God and creatures equivocally.
4) If God exists and creatures exist, and they're dissimilar, God cannot be identical to what's common to creatures (existence), so quiddity and existence must be distinct in God.
5) If God exists and creatures exist, then God can be similar to creatures, so he can have similar attributes e.g. a face, a foot, two shins, two eyes, a leg, a human form etc.

The argument against (2) challenges Neoplatonists and some Ismailis, who claim that ‘existence’ implies genuine similarity between existents, — hence their view that God transcends existence. This reflects a broader issue in their view, — misunderstanding genuine similarity, such as equating negations with similarity.