Sometimes oft repeated numbers need revisiting. One example is...
Michael Kofman@KofmanMichael
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Jul 24, 2024
~2 min read
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Sometimes oft repeated numbers need revisiting. One example is Russian artillery fire rates. These have generally been overestimated going back to 2022, along with ammo consumption rates, with sensational 60k per day figures. A short thread. 1/
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First, what are we counting? The numbers given out are typically for main caliber artillery types: 152mm, 122mm, MLRS (300, 220, 122), and 120mm mortars. This figure is not inclusive of smaller infantry mortars, anti-tank guns, tanks used indirect fire roles, etc. 2/
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Russian fire rates for 2022 were probably in the 15,000-20,000 range. Likely ~18,000 (see forthcoming podcast discussion on this). There’s little evidence that Russian fires reached 60,000 per day in 2022. The peaks were likely double the figure above, at 35,000-40,000. 3/
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This brings the annualized fire rate closer to 5.5-6M in 2022. That does not include ammunition supplies destroyed in strikes, and it is difficult to account for what that might add up to. A conservative guess is another 500K-1M. 4/
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Where did the 60k figure come from? At a certain point in Spring 2022 Ukraine was firing on average 5-6K per day. Russia had a localized 10:1 fires advantage in select areas. I suspect this was multiplied out to generate the 60k figure, but this was never representative. 5/
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The Russian fire rate declined from probably 15k in winter of 2023, to less than 10k by the summer, and increased back again in October due to an influx of North Korean ammo. Ukraine had fires parity, and at times a slight advantage in the south during summer of 2023. 6/
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By summer 2023 Russian forces increasingly used Lancets in counterbattery roles, had access to large quantities of FPVs, and increased numbers of PGMs, with reduced emphasis on a volume of fire approach for certain missions. 7/
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The Russian average for 2023 is probably closer to 10k daily expenditure, and Russian fires have held steady at that figure so far in 2024. Notably, it has not declined significantly despite large quantities of FPVs, and other types of strike UAS being employed by the force.
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I would say it is fair to debate whether these figures should be inclusive of MLRS, conservatively, or limited to tube artillery. But in both cases the figures on fire rates and ammo expenditure need to be revised downwards.