@JoeMegalith: 1/The Attack America Buried: ...
@JoeMegalith
13 views
Jun 08, 2026
Advertisement
1
1/
The Attack America Buried: USS Liberty, June 8, 1967
What the Declassified Record Actually Shows
Every claim traces to primary sources: State Department FRUS archives, CIA memoranda, Naval Intelligence cables, NSA signals intelligence assessments. Cited by name, volume, and document number.
No anonymous sources. No contested interpretations. The files speak for themselves. 🧵
The Attack America Buried: USS Liberty, June 8, 1967
What the Declassified Record Actually Shows
Every claim traces to primary sources: State Department FRUS archives, CIA memoranda, Naval Intelligence cables, NSA signals intelligence assessments. Cited by name, volume, and document number.
No anonymous sources. No contested interpretations. The files speak for themselves. 🧵
2
2/
On June 8, 1967, Israeli air and naval forces attacked the USS Liberty — a United States Navy signals intelligence ship operating legally in international waters in the eastern Mediterranean.
34 Americans killed. 171 wounded. The ship left listing and on fire, communications nearly destroyed, crew fighting to survive.
Israeli government called it a tragic case of mistaken identity. The United States government accepted that explanation within hours. The investigation lasted eleven days. Findings classified. Survivors ordered not to discuss what happened. Case closed for all official purposes.
The declassified record tells a different story.
On June 8, 1967, Israeli air and naval forces attacked the USS Liberty — a United States Navy signals intelligence ship operating legally in international waters in the eastern Mediterranean.
34 Americans killed. 171 wounded. The ship left listing and on fire, communications nearly destroyed, crew fighting to survive.
Israeli government called it a tragic case of mistaken identity. The United States government accepted that explanation within hours. The investigation lasted eleven days. Findings classified. Survivors ordered not to discuss what happened. Case closed for all official purposes.
The declassified record tells a different story.
3
3/
Not a different story about who fired — Israel did, and that has never been in dispute.
A different story about what the U.S. government knew before, during, and after the attack. About what decisions were made and by whom. About what was suppressed, and why. About what the documents actually say compared to what the public was told.
The documents have been available for decades. Most Americans have never read them. What follows is what they say.
Not a different story about who fired — Israel did, and that has never been in dispute.
A different story about what the U.S. government knew before, during, and after the attack. About what decisions were made and by whom. About what was suppressed, and why. About what the documents actually say compared to what the public was told.
The documents have been available for decades. Most Americans have never read them. What follows is what they say.
4
4/
The Days Before — What The Intelligence Record Shows
The Liberty was not in the eastern Mediterranean by accident. She was an NSA technical research ship — one of the most sophisticated signals intelligence platforms in the American fleet — assigned to collect communications intelligence on the Arab-Israeli conflict that had erupted on June 5, 1967.
The Six Day War had begun three days before the attack. Israel had launched devastating preemptive air strikes against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on June 5. By June 8 the war was three days old and Israeli forces were advancing rapidly on all fronts.
In Washington, the Johnson administration was managing competing pressures with extraordinary delicacy. American military equipment flowed to Israel through multiple channels. The political network connecting the Israeli government to the White House — through fundraisers, informal back-channels, and personal relationships — was active and operating at maximum intensity during the crisis.
The Liberty was operating legally in international waters. Her mission was to collect signals intelligence. She was clearly marked as a U.S. Navy vessel. She flew the American flag. None of this protected her.
The Days Before — What The Intelligence Record Shows
The Liberty was not in the eastern Mediterranean by accident. She was an NSA technical research ship — one of the most sophisticated signals intelligence platforms in the American fleet — assigned to collect communications intelligence on the Arab-Israeli conflict that had erupted on June 5, 1967.
The Six Day War had begun three days before the attack. Israel had launched devastating preemptive air strikes against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on June 5. By June 8 the war was three days old and Israeli forces were advancing rapidly on all fronts.
In Washington, the Johnson administration was managing competing pressures with extraordinary delicacy. American military equipment flowed to Israel through multiple channels. The political network connecting the Israeli government to the White House — through fundraisers, informal back-channels, and personal relationships — was active and operating at maximum intensity during the crisis.
The Liberty was operating legally in international waters. Her mission was to collect signals intelligence. She was clearly marked as a U.S. Navy vessel. She flew the American flag. None of this protected her.
5
5/
June 8, 1967 — The Attack
At approximately 2:00 p.m. local time, Israeli aircraft began attacking USS Liberty. They made multiple passes, firing rockets and cannon. They dropped napalm. They jammed the Liberty’s radio frequencies — including the international distress frequency — as the attack was underway.
The jamming of the distress frequency is documented in NSA records. It is not disputed. Jamming an international distress frequency requires deliberate, sophisticated action. It is not the product of confusion or mistaken identity.
The air attack lasted approximately 25 minutes.
June 8, 1967 — The Attack
At approximately 2:00 p.m. local time, Israeli aircraft began attacking USS Liberty. They made multiple passes, firing rockets and cannon. They dropped napalm. They jammed the Liberty’s radio frequencies — including the international distress frequency — as the attack was underway.
The jamming of the distress frequency is documented in NSA records. It is not disputed. Jamming an international distress frequency requires deliberate, sophisticated action. It is not the product of confusion or mistaken identity.
The air attack lasted approximately 25 minutes.
6
6/
When it ended, Israeli torpedo boats approached and fired five torpedoes at the Liberty. One struck amidships and tore a 40-foot hole in the hull. The torpedo boats then strafed the Liberty’s life rafts — a war crime under international law — as Liberty crew attempted to deploy them.
34 Americans were killed. 171 were wounded. The Liberty was left on fire, listing, and barely afloat. She did not sink — her crew fought to keep her alive through extraordinary effort.
The entire attack lasted approximately 75 minutes.
When it ended, Israeli torpedo boats approached and fired five torpedoes at the Liberty. One struck amidships and tore a 40-foot hole in the hull. The torpedo boats then strafed the Liberty’s life rafts — a war crime under international law — as Liberty crew attempted to deploy them.
34 Americans were killed. 171 were wounded. The Liberty was left on fire, listing, and barely afloat. She did not sink — her crew fought to keep her alive through extraordinary effort.
The entire attack lasted approximately 75 minutes.
7
7/
The Rescue Aircraft — What Was Ordered and What Happened
When the Liberty’s distress calls finally got through — after Israeli jamming was lifted — the USS Saratoga and USS America, operating in the eastern Mediterranean, launched aircraft to assist. The aircraft were recalled before they reached the Liberty.
They were recalled twice.
The first recall order came from the Sixth Fleet commander. The second, when the Sixth Fleet attempted to launch again, came from the Secretary of Defense.
Robert McNamara personally ordered the recall of American aircraft launched to assist an American ship under attack.
This fact is documented. It is not disputed by the participants. McNamara acknowledged giving the recall order.
The Rescue Aircraft — What Was Ordered and What Happened
When the Liberty’s distress calls finally got through — after Israeli jamming was lifted — the USS Saratoga and USS America, operating in the eastern Mediterranean, launched aircraft to assist. The aircraft were recalled before they reached the Liberty.
They were recalled twice.
The first recall order came from the Sixth Fleet commander. The second, when the Sixth Fleet attempted to launch again, came from the Secretary of Defense.
Robert McNamara personally ordered the recall of American aircraft launched to assist an American ship under attack.
This fact is documented. It is not disputed by the participants. McNamara acknowledged giving the recall order.
8
8/
The stated justification — that the aircraft were nuclear-armed and their launch might have escalated the conflict — has been disputed by naval personnel who noted that conventional aircraft were available and that the nuclear-armed nature of some aircraft was not a reason to abandon an attacked American vessel.
What is documented beyond dispute: American aircraft were in the air headed toward an American ship under attack. Those aircraft were recalled. American sailors died during the time it took for help to arrive. No senior official was ever held accountable for the decision to recall.
Source: Multiple survivor accounts and subsequent congressional testimony. The Sixth Fleet message traffic is referenced in declassified NSC records.
The stated justification — that the aircraft were nuclear-armed and their launch might have escalated the conflict — has been disputed by naval personnel who noted that conventional aircraft were available and that the nuclear-armed nature of some aircraft was not a reason to abandon an attacked American vessel.
What is documented beyond dispute: American aircraft were in the air headed toward an American ship under attack. Those aircraft were recalled. American sailors died during the time it took for help to arrive. No senior official was ever held accountable for the decision to recall.
Source: Multiple survivor accounts and subsequent congressional testimony. The Sixth Fleet message traffic is referenced in declassified NSC records.
9
9/
The Hotline — LBJ’s Response Within 90 Minutes
The most extraordinary document in the Liberty record is not about the attack itself. It is about what happened on the Washington-Moscow hotline within 90 minutes of the attack becoming known to the White House.
President Johnson used the hotline to contact Soviet Premier Kosygin to explain that American aircraft — the rescue aircraft now being recalled — were not a threatening move but a response to a communications problem with an American ship.
The key element: Johnson described the situation on the hotline using language that accepted the “accident” explanation before any investigation had occurred, before any facts had been established, before survivors had even been interviewed.
Within 90 minutes of the attack LBJ was already managing the diplomatic narrative. Not demanding answers. Not expressing outrage. Managing the narrative.
Source: FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967.
The Hotline — LBJ’s Response Within 90 Minutes
The most extraordinary document in the Liberty record is not about the attack itself. It is about what happened on the Washington-Moscow hotline within 90 minutes of the attack becoming known to the White House.
President Johnson used the hotline to contact Soviet Premier Kosygin to explain that American aircraft — the rescue aircraft now being recalled — were not a threatening move but a response to a communications problem with an American ship.
The key element: Johnson described the situation on the hotline using language that accepted the “accident” explanation before any investigation had occurred, before any facts had been established, before survivors had even been interviewed.
Within 90 minutes of the attack LBJ was already managing the diplomatic narrative. Not demanding answers. Not expressing outrage. Managing the narrative.
Source: FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967.
10
10/
The Israeli Court of Inquiry — The Document They Gave Us
On June 17, 1967 — nine days after the attack — the Israeli Defense Forces provided the U.S. Navy’s ALUSNA officer with a synopsis of their own court of inquiry findings. This document is filed in U.S. military archives. The ALUSNA officer who received the verbal briefing from Israeli Lieutenant Colonel Efrat transcribed it verbatim.
Document number 88067. Transmitted June 19, 1967.
The Israeli findings, as dictated by Colonel Efrat, concluded:
“IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE EVIDENCE AND FROM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY WAS NOT IN MALICE; THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE ATTACK WAS MADE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.”
The Israeli inquiry identified three mistakes: a wrong report that El-Arish was being shelled from the sea; a mistaken report that Liberty was steaming at 30 knots; and errors in aircraft identification.
Then — and this is the document’s most revealing element — the Israeli finding blamed the Liberty itself:
“THE AMERICAN SHIP ACTED WITH LACK OF CARE BY ENDANGERING ITSELF TO A GRAVE EXTENT BY APPROACHING EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN AN AREA WHICH WAS A SCENE OF WAR AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS AREA IS NOT ONE WHERE SHIPS GENERALLY PASS, THIS WITHOUT ADVISING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OF ITS PRESENCE AND WITHOUT IDENTIFYING ITSELF ELABORATELY.”
The Israeli court concluded that Liberty tried to hide its identity, flew a small flag difficult to identify from a distance, and failed to identify itself when asked.
The Israeli Court of Inquiry — The Document They Gave Us
On June 17, 1967 — nine days after the attack — the Israeli Defense Forces provided the U.S. Navy’s ALUSNA officer with a synopsis of their own court of inquiry findings. This document is filed in U.S. military archives. The ALUSNA officer who received the verbal briefing from Israeli Lieutenant Colonel Efrat transcribed it verbatim.
Document number 88067. Transmitted June 19, 1967.
The Israeli findings, as dictated by Colonel Efrat, concluded:
“IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE EVIDENCE AND FROM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY WAS NOT IN MALICE; THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE ATTACK WAS MADE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.”
The Israeli inquiry identified three mistakes: a wrong report that El-Arish was being shelled from the sea; a mistaken report that Liberty was steaming at 30 knots; and errors in aircraft identification.
Then — and this is the document’s most revealing element — the Israeli finding blamed the Liberty itself:
“THE AMERICAN SHIP ACTED WITH LACK OF CARE BY ENDANGERING ITSELF TO A GRAVE EXTENT BY APPROACHING EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN AN AREA WHICH WAS A SCENE OF WAR AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS AREA IS NOT ONE WHERE SHIPS GENERALLY PASS, THIS WITHOUT ADVISING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OF ITS PRESENCE AND WITHOUT IDENTIFYING ITSELF ELABORATELY.”
The Israeli court concluded that Liberty tried to hide its identity, flew a small flag difficult to identify from a distance, and failed to identify itself when asked.
11
11/
Now read what the ALUSNA officer wrote about this briefing — his evaluation, filed simultaneously with the verbatim transcript:
“LTC EFRAT PROBABLY NOTED ALUSNA’S APPEARANCE OF SURPRISE AND INCREDULITY AS HE READ OFF SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN HE FINISHED HIS READING HE ASKED WHAT ALUSNA THOUGHT OF THE FINDINGS QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE. ALUSNA PRETENDED HE HAD NOT HEARD THE QUESTION AND THANKED THE COLONEL FOR HIS TIME. THE BURDEN OF DIPLOMACY BORE HEAVILY ON ALUSNA.”
An American Navy officer. In an official cable. Describing his own incredulity at the Israeli findings. Pretending not to hear the question. Noting that diplomacy required him to suppress his reaction.
The burden of diplomacy bore heavily. That phrase is the Liberty story in eight words.
Source: Naval message 88067, filed in U.S. military archives.
Now read what the ALUSNA officer wrote about this briefing — his evaluation, filed simultaneously with the verbatim transcript:
“LTC EFRAT PROBABLY NOTED ALUSNA’S APPEARANCE OF SURPRISE AND INCREDULITY AS HE READ OFF SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN HE FINISHED HIS READING HE ASKED WHAT ALUSNA THOUGHT OF THE FINDINGS QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE. ALUSNA PRETENDED HE HAD NOT HEARD THE QUESTION AND THANKED THE COLONEL FOR HIS TIME. THE BURDEN OF DIPLOMACY BORE HEAVILY ON ALUSNA.”
An American Navy officer. In an official cable. Describing his own incredulity at the Israeli findings. Pretending not to hear the question. Noting that diplomacy required him to suppress his reaction.
The burden of diplomacy bore heavily. That phrase is the Liberty story in eight words.
Source: Naval message 88067, filed in U.S. military archives.
12
12/
The CIA Intelligence Memorandum — June 13, 1967
Five days after the attack, the CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence produced an intelligence memorandum on the Liberty incident (CIA-RDP84B00049R000902350010-7 — now declassified).
The memorandum’s significance lies not in what it concludes but in what it documents about the intelligence record surrounding the attack. It notes that Liberty had been operating in the area and that her presence and identity should have been known to Israeli forces who had previously identified the vessel.
The CIA memorandum does not support the “innocent mistake” conclusion. It documents the circumstances that make the mistake explanation difficult to sustain. It was prepared for internal CIA distribution, not for public consumption, not with any political objective.
The CIA Intelligence Memorandum — June 13, 1967
Five days after the attack, the CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence produced an intelligence memorandum on the Liberty incident (CIA-RDP84B00049R000902350010-7 — now declassified).
The memorandum’s significance lies not in what it concludes but in what it documents about the intelligence record surrounding the attack. It notes that Liberty had been operating in the area and that her presence and identity should have been known to Israeli forces who had previously identified the vessel.
The CIA memorandum does not support the “innocent mistake” conclusion. It documents the circumstances that make the mistake explanation difficult to sustain. It was prepared for internal CIA distribution, not for public consumption, not with any political objective.
13
13/
The INR Memorandum — The State Department’s Internal Assessment
The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research produced its own internal memorandum on the Liberty attack (to Katzenbach, June 13, 1967 — FRUS Volume XIX).
The INR — the State Department’s intelligence arm — was staffed by analysts whose job was to produce objective assessments for senior policymakers, not to manage the political narrative.
The INR memorandum’s existence in the declassified record is itself significant. It was produced, classified, and eventually released. Its content raises questions about the “tragic mistake” conclusion that the public narrative had already established by the time the document was written.
The INR Memorandum — The State Department’s Internal Assessment
The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research produced its own internal memorandum on the Liberty attack (to Katzenbach, June 13, 1967 — FRUS Volume XIX).
The INR — the State Department’s intelligence arm — was staffed by analysts whose job was to produce objective assessments for senior policymakers, not to manage the political narrative.
The INR memorandum’s existence in the declassified record is itself significant. It was produced, classified, and eventually released. Its content raises questions about the “tragic mistake” conclusion that the public narrative had already established by the time the document was written.
14
14/
What The Signals Intelligence Shows
The Liberty’s primary mission was signals intelligence collection. She had sophisticated electronic equipment. Her crew included NSA personnel. She was, in effect, a listening station that happened to float.
What the Liberty heard and recorded in the hours before and during the attack has never been fully declassified. NSA intercepts related to the attack exist. They were classified. Many remain so.
What has been acknowledged in various declassified contexts: Israeli aircraft communicated with each other and with ground control during the attack. The content of those communications — what pilots said to each other, what the chain of command knew, what orders were given — is the evidentiary heart of the question of intent.
The NSA has maintained over the decades that its signals intelligence from the Liberty attack cannot be released. The justifications have varied. The classification has persisted.
The JCS telegram 7369 — referenced in declassified materials from this period — provides the military command’s contemporaneous assessment of the incident. Its contents remain partially classified.
What can be said from the publicly available record: the signals intelligence picture is not consistent with simple misidentification by a modern military force operating in daylight conditions against a clearly marked vessel flying an American flag.
What The Signals Intelligence Shows
The Liberty’s primary mission was signals intelligence collection. She had sophisticated electronic equipment. Her crew included NSA personnel. She was, in effect, a listening station that happened to float.
What the Liberty heard and recorded in the hours before and during the attack has never been fully declassified. NSA intercepts related to the attack exist. They were classified. Many remain so.
What has been acknowledged in various declassified contexts: Israeli aircraft communicated with each other and with ground control during the attack. The content of those communications — what pilots said to each other, what the chain of command knew, what orders were given — is the evidentiary heart of the question of intent.
The NSA has maintained over the decades that its signals intelligence from the Liberty attack cannot be released. The justifications have varied. The classification has persisted.
The JCS telegram 7369 — referenced in declassified materials from this period — provides the military command’s contemporaneous assessment of the incident. Its contents remain partially classified.
What can be said from the publicly available record: the signals intelligence picture is not consistent with simple misidentification by a modern military force operating in daylight conditions against a clearly marked vessel flying an American flag.
15
15/
The Ram Ron Findings — The Internal Israeli Record
Document 307 of FRUS Volume XIX contains what is known as the Ram Ron findings — the Israeli military’s internal assessment of the Liberty incident, provided through back-channels to American officials.
The Ram Ron document is significant because it represents what Israeli military authorities actually concluded in their internal review, as distinct from what was stated publicly. The document has been partially declassified and its existence in the FRUS record acknowledges it as a document American officials received and retained.
The contents of the Ram Ron findings, as reflected in the FRUS record, do not fully align with the public Israeli position. The internal military assessment is more candid about the sequence of events and the intelligence picture available to Israeli forces before and during the attack.
The Ram Ron Findings — The Internal Israeli Record
Document 307 of FRUS Volume XIX contains what is known as the Ram Ron findings — the Israeli military’s internal assessment of the Liberty incident, provided through back-channels to American officials.
The Ram Ron document is significant because it represents what Israeli military authorities actually concluded in their internal review, as distinct from what was stated publicly. The document has been partially declassified and its existence in the FRUS record acknowledges it as a document American officials received and retained.
The contents of the Ram Ron findings, as reflected in the FRUS record, do not fully align with the public Israeli position. The internal military assessment is more candid about the sequence of events and the intelligence picture available to Israeli forces before and during the attack.
16
16/
The Survivor Gag Order — Documented
Liberty survivors were ordered not to discuss the attack. This is documented and not disputed. Naval personnel are under command authority and orders restricting their public statements are legal. The existence of such orders does not itself prove a cover-up.
What the survivor gag order does prove is that the United States government made a deliberate institutional decision to suppress the firsthand testimony of those most directly positioned to describe what happened.
The survivors have spoken, over the decades, in formal testimony and informal accounts. Their accounts are consistent with each other and inconsistent with the official “tragic mistake” conclusion in specific and documented ways. They describe the size of the American flag that was flying — large and visible. They describe aircraft making multiple passes at low altitude before attacking — the reconnaissance passes that would have allowed identification. They describe the jamming of their distress frequencies during the attack.
None of this testimony has been formally incorporated into any official American inquiry that reached conclusions inconsistent with the accepted narrative.
The Navy Court of Inquiry was the most expedited, restricted investigation in its power to conduct. The court was given eleven days. Survivors were interviewed in conditions that did not allow them to freely testify about what they believed they had observed.
The findings were consistent with the “tragic mistake” conclusion. The presiding officer, Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd, later stated to a survivor that he had been ordered to conclude the attack was accidental regardless of the evidence. He operated under time constraints and political pressure that he himself later acknowledged.
The Survivor Gag Order — Documented
Liberty survivors were ordered not to discuss the attack. This is documented and not disputed. Naval personnel are under command authority and orders restricting their public statements are legal. The existence of such orders does not itself prove a cover-up.
What the survivor gag order does prove is that the United States government made a deliberate institutional decision to suppress the firsthand testimony of those most directly positioned to describe what happened.
The survivors have spoken, over the decades, in formal testimony and informal accounts. Their accounts are consistent with each other and inconsistent with the official “tragic mistake” conclusion in specific and documented ways. They describe the size of the American flag that was flying — large and visible. They describe aircraft making multiple passes at low altitude before attacking — the reconnaissance passes that would have allowed identification. They describe the jamming of their distress frequencies during the attack.
None of this testimony has been formally incorporated into any official American inquiry that reached conclusions inconsistent with the accepted narrative.
The Navy Court of Inquiry was the most expedited, restricted investigation in its power to conduct. The court was given eleven days. Survivors were interviewed in conditions that did not allow them to freely testify about what they believed they had observed.
The findings were consistent with the “tragic mistake” conclusion. The presiding officer, Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd, later stated to a survivor that he had been ordered to conclude the attack was accidental regardless of the evidence. He operated under time constraints and political pressure that he himself later acknowledged.
17
17/
Mathilde Krim — The Document That Changes The Context
On the morning of June 5, 1967 — the day the Six Day War began — President Johnson went to the third-floor White House bedroom of Mathilde Krim to inform her that the war had started. He said “We are at war.” Then left.
Mathilde Krim was the wife of Arthur Krim — LBJ’s primary fundraiser and chairman of the Democratic National Finance Committee. She had been born in Switzerland, joined the Irgun as a young woman, and smuggled weapons across the French border for Zionist militants before and after the 1948 Israeli war of independence. She and Arthur had a permanent room in the White House. They had built a house on Lake Lyndon B. Johnson to be near his Texas ranch.
She was the president’s most intimate non-governmental contact on Israeli matters. She dictated memos to Johnson advising him what to say publicly about the war. She managed his relationship with the American Jewish community in real time during the crisis.
Three days after Johnson told Krim the war had started — on June 8, 1967 — Israeli forces attacked USS Liberty.
The political access mechanism is documented in the LBJ Library oral history archive, in White House daily diary records, and in Donald Neff’s Warriors for Jerusalem (1984), which drew on these primary sources.
Mathilde Krim — The Document That Changes The Context
On the morning of June 5, 1967 — the day the Six Day War began — President Johnson went to the third-floor White House bedroom of Mathilde Krim to inform her that the war had started. He said “We are at war.” Then left.
Mathilde Krim was the wife of Arthur Krim — LBJ’s primary fundraiser and chairman of the Democratic National Finance Committee. She had been born in Switzerland, joined the Irgun as a young woman, and smuggled weapons across the French border for Zionist militants before and after the 1948 Israeli war of independence. She and Arthur had a permanent room in the White House. They had built a house on Lake Lyndon B. Johnson to be near his Texas ranch.
She was the president’s most intimate non-governmental contact on Israeli matters. She dictated memos to Johnson advising him what to say publicly about the war. She managed his relationship with the American Jewish community in real time during the crisis.
Three days after Johnson told Krim the war had started — on June 8, 1967 — Israeli forces attacked USS Liberty.
The political access mechanism is documented in the LBJ Library oral history archive, in White House daily diary records, and in Donald Neff’s Warriors for Jerusalem (1984), which drew on these primary sources.
18
18/
Abraham Feinberg — LBJ’s personal fundraiser and documented coordinator of funding for the Israeli nuclear weapons program — was simultaneously operating as a back-channel relay between the Israeli government and the White House during NSC meetings. FRUS records document his presence and function.
The president who received the Liberty attack, managed its aftermath, recalled the rescue aircraft, and accepted the Israeli explanation within hours was simultaneously the president whose most intimate non-governmental contact on Israeli affairs was a former Irgun member with a permanent White House room, whose primary fundraiser was documented as the funding coordinator for the Israeli nuclear weapons program.
These are documented facts. They do not prove intent. They establish the political environment within which the decisions documented above were made.
Abraham Feinberg — LBJ’s personal fundraiser and documented coordinator of funding for the Israeli nuclear weapons program — was simultaneously operating as a back-channel relay between the Israeli government and the White House during NSC meetings. FRUS records document his presence and function.
The president who received the Liberty attack, managed its aftermath, recalled the rescue aircraft, and accepted the Israeli explanation within hours was simultaneously the president whose most intimate non-governmental contact on Israeli affairs was a former Irgun member with a permanent White House room, whose primary fundraiser was documented as the funding coordinator for the Israeli nuclear weapons program.
These are documented facts. They do not prove intent. They establish the political environment within which the decisions documented above were made.
19
19/
The Cover-Up In Real Time — The Sequence
Here is the documented sequence of official American responses to the Liberty attack:
• Within 90 minutes: President Johnson uses the Moscow hotline to explain the situation, using language that accepts the accidental explanation before any investigation.
• Within hours: The United States publicly accepts Israel’s preliminary explanation that the attack was a case of mistaken identity.
• Within days: The Navy convenes a Court of Inquiry — the most expedited, restricted investigation in its power to conduct. The court is given eleven days. Survivors are interviewed in conditions that did not allow them to freely testify about what they believed they had observed.
The findings: The Court of Inquiry, operating under time constraints and political pressure that its own presiding officer later acknowledged, produced findings consistent with the “tragic mistake” conclusion. The presiding officer, Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd, later stated to a survivor that he had been ordered to conclude the attack was accidental regardless of the evidence.
The survivors: Ordered not to discuss the attack publicly. Many obeyed for years. Some did not.
The NSA: Classified its Liberty-related signals intelligence. Has resisted releasing it for six decades.
The CIA: Filed the Liberty incident alongside NUMEC and MKULTRA in a 1978 internal memorandum as a case requiring permanent FOIA protection from public disclosure (CIA-RDP81M00980R0002002-0038-7 — now declassified).
The Cover-Up In Real Time — The Sequence
Here is the documented sequence of official American responses to the Liberty attack:
• Within 90 minutes: President Johnson uses the Moscow hotline to explain the situation, using language that accepts the accidental explanation before any investigation.
• Within hours: The United States publicly accepts Israel’s preliminary explanation that the attack was a case of mistaken identity.
• Within days: The Navy convenes a Court of Inquiry — the most expedited, restricted investigation in its power to conduct. The court is given eleven days. Survivors are interviewed in conditions that did not allow them to freely testify about what they believed they had observed.
The findings: The Court of Inquiry, operating under time constraints and political pressure that its own presiding officer later acknowledged, produced findings consistent with the “tragic mistake” conclusion. The presiding officer, Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd, later stated to a survivor that he had been ordered to conclude the attack was accidental regardless of the evidence.
The survivors: Ordered not to discuss the attack publicly. Many obeyed for years. Some did not.
The NSA: Classified its Liberty-related signals intelligence. Has resisted releasing it for six decades.
The CIA: Filed the Liberty incident alongside NUMEC and MKULTRA in a 1978 internal memorandum as a case requiring permanent FOIA protection from public disclosure (CIA-RDP81M00980R0002002-0038-7 — now declassified).
20
20/
The Same President, The Same Year, The Same Response
What the declassified record establishes — and what no mainstream account has placed in full context — is that the Liberty attack was one of two Israeli operations against American national security interests that Lyndon Johnson covered up in 1967 and 1968.
The second was NUMEC.
Over 300 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium disappeared from a nuclear fuel processing plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania between 1965 and 1968. CIA Director Richard Helms briefed Johnson on the CIA’s conclusion that the uranium had gone to Israel’s nuclear weapons program at Dimona. Johnson’s response, recorded verbatim by CIA Deputy Director Carl Duckett in a 1978 NRC inquiry transcript: “Don’t tell anyone else, even Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara.”
Same president. Same year. An Israeli operation kills 34 Americans and steals American military technology. An Israeli operation steals weapons-grade nuclear material. The president is told about both. The president’s response to both: suppress it.
The CIA’s 1978 internal memorandum listing cases requiring FOIA protection explicitly names “Israeli firing on the Liberty” and “NUMEC” in the same sentence.
The CIA filed them together because they were connected. Not by conspiracy — by the documented response of a single president to two Israeli operations against American interests in the same year.
The Same President, The Same Year, The Same Response
What the declassified record establishes — and what no mainstream account has placed in full context — is that the Liberty attack was one of two Israeli operations against American national security interests that Lyndon Johnson covered up in 1967 and 1968.
The second was NUMEC.
Over 300 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium disappeared from a nuclear fuel processing plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania between 1965 and 1968. CIA Director Richard Helms briefed Johnson on the CIA’s conclusion that the uranium had gone to Israel’s nuclear weapons program at Dimona. Johnson’s response, recorded verbatim by CIA Deputy Director Carl Duckett in a 1978 NRC inquiry transcript: “Don’t tell anyone else, even Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara.”
Same president. Same year. An Israeli operation kills 34 Americans and steals American military technology. An Israeli operation steals weapons-grade nuclear material. The president is told about both. The president’s response to both: suppress it.
The CIA’s 1978 internal memorandum listing cases requiring FOIA protection explicitly names “Israeli firing on the Liberty” and “NUMEC” in the same sentence.
The CIA filed them together because they were connected. Not by conspiracy — by the documented response of a single president to two Israeli operations against American interests in the same year.
21
21/
What The Documents Show And What They Don’t
The declassified record establishes the following with documentary certainty:
✅ Israeli aircraft jammed Liberty’s distress frequencies during the attack. This requires sophisticated deliberate action and is incompatible with the chaos of genuine misidentification.
✅ American rescue aircraft were launched and recalled — twice — while the attack was underway. American sailors died during the interval.
✅ President Johnson accepted the Israeli explanation on the Moscow hotline within 90 minutes, before any investigation had occurred.
✅ The Navy Court of Inquiry was given eleven days and operated under conditions that its presiding officer later described as politically constrained.
✅ The survivors were ordered not to discuss the attack publicly.
✅ The CIA, NSA, and multiple executive branch agencies have maintained classification on Liberty-related materials for six decades, citing the same “liaison equity” justification used to protect other Israeli intelligence operations against American interests.
✅ The political environment within which these decisions were made included LBJ’s most intimate non-governmental contact on Israeli affairs sleeping in the White House during the crisis, and his primary fundraiser serving as a documented back-channel between the Israeli government and the White House.
What The Documents Show And What They Don’t
The declassified record establishes the following with documentary certainty:
✅ Israeli aircraft jammed Liberty’s distress frequencies during the attack. This requires sophisticated deliberate action and is incompatible with the chaos of genuine misidentification.
✅ American rescue aircraft were launched and recalled — twice — while the attack was underway. American sailors died during the interval.
✅ President Johnson accepted the Israeli explanation on the Moscow hotline within 90 minutes, before any investigation had occurred.
✅ The Navy Court of Inquiry was given eleven days and operated under conditions that its presiding officer later described as politically constrained.
✅ The survivors were ordered not to discuss the attack publicly.
✅ The CIA, NSA, and multiple executive branch agencies have maintained classification on Liberty-related materials for six decades, citing the same “liaison equity” justification used to protect other Israeli intelligence operations against American interests.
✅ The political environment within which these decisions were made included LBJ’s most intimate non-governmental contact on Israeli affairs sleeping in the White House during the crisis, and his primary fundraiser serving as a documented back-channel between the Israeli government and the White House.
22
22/
What the declassified record does not establish with documentary certainty: that the attack was deliberate. The signals intelligence that would most directly answer that question remains classified.
What the declassified record establishes beyond reasonable dispute: that the investigation was inadequate, that the survivors were suppressed, that the political environment compromised the independence of every American official involved in the response, and that the United States government made a series of deliberate decisions to protect the relationship with Israel at the expense of accountability for 34 dead American sailors.
What the declassified record does not establish with documentary certainty: that the attack was deliberate. The signals intelligence that would most directly answer that question remains classified.
What the declassified record establishes beyond reasonable dispute: that the investigation was inadequate, that the survivors were suppressed, that the political environment compromised the independence of every American official involved in the response, and that the United States government made a series of deliberate decisions to protect the relationship with Israel at the expense of accountability for 34 dead American sailors.
23
23/
The Survivors — Fifty-Eight Years Later
The men who served on USS Liberty are old now. Many are gone. Those who remain have spent decades trying to get their government to conduct a real investigation — one with subpoena power, one that examines the NSA signals intelligence, one that hears testimony under oath without political constraint.
They have never gotten it.
Every request for a formal congressional investigation has been deflected. Every appeal for declassification of the remaining NSA materials has been denied or delayed. Every attempt to put the question before a body with real investigative authority has encountered the same institutional response: the matter is closed, the conclusion is settled, the accident finding stands.
The men who were on the ship — who were strafed, who watched their friends die, who felt the torpedo strike, who saw what they saw — are told that the record is settled.
The record is not settled. The record shows what this thread shows. The questions the survivors have asked for fifty-eight years are the questions the documents raise.
They deserve answers that the documents alone cannot fully provide — the classified signals intelligence, the full NSA intercepts, the complete internal Israeli military assessments.
They have not received them.
They may never receive them.
But the documents that exist are enough to establish that what they were told — what the American public was told — is not what the classified record shows.
The Survivors — Fifty-Eight Years Later
The men who served on USS Liberty are old now. Many are gone. Those who remain have spent decades trying to get their government to conduct a real investigation — one with subpoena power, one that examines the NSA signals intelligence, one that hears testimony under oath without political constraint.
They have never gotten it.
Every request for a formal congressional investigation has been deflected. Every appeal for declassification of the remaining NSA materials has been denied or delayed. Every attempt to put the question before a body with real investigative authority has encountered the same institutional response: the matter is closed, the conclusion is settled, the accident finding stands.
The men who were on the ship — who were strafed, who watched their friends die, who felt the torpedo strike, who saw what they saw — are told that the record is settled.
The record is not settled. The record shows what this thread shows. The questions the survivors have asked for fifty-eight years are the questions the documents raise.
They deserve answers that the documents alone cannot fully provide — the classified signals intelligence, the full NSA intercepts, the complete internal Israeli military assessments.
They have not received them.
They may never receive them.
But the documents that exist are enough to establish that what they were told — what the American public was told — is not what the classified record shows.
24
24/
Primary Sources
FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX — Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967. history.state.gov/historicaldocu…. Contains Documents 151-307 covering the Liberty incident and its aftermath including NSC deliberations, State Department cables, and the Ram Ron findings.
CIA intelligence memorandum, June 13, 1967 — CIA-RDP84B00049R000902350010-7. Available through CIA CREST database.
INR memorandum to Katzenbach, June 13, 1967 — FRUS Volume XIX.
JCS telegram 7369 — Referenced in FRUS Volume XIX documents.
Ram Ron findings — FRUS Volume XIX, Document 307.
Naval message 88067, June 19, 1967 — ALUSNA transcription of Israeli Court of Inquiry findings. Includes ALUSNA officer evaluation noting his “appearance of surprise and incredulity.” Filed in U.S. military archives.
CIA internal memorandum, January 16, 1978 — CIA-RDP81M00980R0002002-0038-7. Lists Liberty and NUMEC alongside MKULTRA as cases requiring FOIA protection. Available through CIA CREST database.
LBJ Library oral history archive — Mathilde Krim interviews documenting her access and role during the 1967 crisis.
Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days that Changed the Middle East (1984) — Draws on White House diary records and documents Mathilde Krim’s presence and function during the crisis period.
William Quandt, Peace Process — Documents Abraham Feinberg’s role as back-channel relay between Israeli government and White House during NSC meetings.
NRC Inquiry Into the Testimony of the Executive Director for Operations, Volume III, February 1978, p. 178 — Duckett interview transcript with LBJ quote verbatim. CIA document C05695277.
Primary Sources
FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX — Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967. history.state.gov/historicaldocu…. Contains Documents 151-307 covering the Liberty incident and its aftermath including NSC deliberations, State Department cables, and the Ram Ron findings.
CIA intelligence memorandum, June 13, 1967 — CIA-RDP84B00049R000902350010-7. Available through CIA CREST database.
INR memorandum to Katzenbach, June 13, 1967 — FRUS Volume XIX.
JCS telegram 7369 — Referenced in FRUS Volume XIX documents.
Ram Ron findings — FRUS Volume XIX, Document 307.
Naval message 88067, June 19, 1967 — ALUSNA transcription of Israeli Court of Inquiry findings. Includes ALUSNA officer evaluation noting his “appearance of surprise and incredulity.” Filed in U.S. military archives.
CIA internal memorandum, January 16, 1978 — CIA-RDP81M00980R0002002-0038-7. Lists Liberty and NUMEC alongside MKULTRA as cases requiring FOIA protection. Available through CIA CREST database.
LBJ Library oral history archive — Mathilde Krim interviews documenting her access and role during the 1967 crisis.
Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days that Changed the Middle East (1984) — Draws on White House diary records and documents Mathilde Krim’s presence and function during the crisis period.
William Quandt, Peace Process — Documents Abraham Feinberg’s role as back-channel relay between Israeli government and White House during NSC meetings.
NRC Inquiry Into the Testimony of the Executive Director for Operations, Volume III, February 1978, p. 178 — Duckett interview transcript with LBJ quote verbatim. CIA document C05695277.
25
25/
Every claim in this thread traces to a primary source document. Nothing here requires trust in anonymous sources, secondhand accounts, or contested interpretations. The files speak for themselves.
The declassified record does not prove the attack was deliberate — the key signals intelligence remains classified.
But it proves the investigation was inadequate, the survivors were suppressed, and the United States government made deliberate decisions to protect the relationship with Israel at the expense of accountability for 34 dead American sailors.
58 years later, the questions remain. The documents are waiting.
Read them.
The attack America buried deserves to be exhumed.
Every claim in this thread traces to a primary source document. Nothing here requires trust in anonymous sources, secondhand accounts, or contested interpretations. The files speak for themselves.
The declassified record does not prove the attack was deliberate — the key signals intelligence remains classified.
But it proves the investigation was inadequate, the survivors were suppressed, and the United States government made deliberate decisions to protect the relationship with Israel at the expense of accountability for 34 dead American sailors.
58 years later, the questions remain. The documents are waiting.
Read them.
The attack America buried deserves to be exhumed.