@RZimmt: What Can Be Learned from the I...
@RZimmt
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May 11, 2026
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What Can Be Learned from the Iranian Response:
A. Tehran’s underlying assumptions have not changed. From Iran’s perspective, it won the confrontation; the other side will blink first because of the accumulating economic damage; the U.S. is not interested in renewing the hostilities; and even if the war resumes, Iran retains the capability to inflict significant additional damage, particularly on the Gulf states.
Not only have these assumptions remained unchanged since the ceasefire, but they have actually been reinforced over the past two weeks in light of U.S. conduct toward Iran: Washington’s tolerance of delays in the Iranian response, the relatively weak response to attacks on American destroyers, the absence of any U.S. response to attacks on tankers and targets in the UAE, and the suspension of the "liberation project."
B. Iran is prepared for certain concessions, including on the nuclear issue, but is unwilling to return to the status quo that existed prior to February 28 and insists on securing vital economic and security guarantees.
The economic guarantees, deemed necessary for postwar reconstruction, include sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets.
The security guarantees, intended to prevent future attacks, include preserving some control over the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining essential nuclear capabilities.
Therefore:
A. Iran is unwilling to relinquish its two most significant leverage cards — control over Hormuz and fissile material — before a final and definitive end to the war.
B. Iran will demand substantial economic relief already in the early stages of implementing any agreement, based on the assumption that there is no certainty negotiations will progress in a way that enables it to obtain such benefits later on.
C. Iran is unwilling to permanently dismantle capabilities, for example, nuclear infrastructure, in a way that would prevent it from restoring them in the future.
There is considerable doubt that these underlying assumptions will change even if economic pressure continues or military strikes are renewed. Faced with a choice between war and capitulation to U.S. dictates, the Iranian leadership chooses war. This was true before the war, and it is even more true under the “new” leadership in Tehran headed by Mojtaba Khamenei and the IRGC.
The U.S. currently faces four main options—none of them particularly good:
A. Continue economic pressure despite growing recognition in Washington itself (as reflected in the intelligence assessment published last week) that Iran likely has the ability to withstand the naval blockade for months.
B. Launch another offensive operation aimed primarily at inflicting pain on Iran and further complicating postwar reconstruction through attacks on infrastructure and power stations, although it is highly doubtful such a move would alter the calculations of the leadership in Tehran.
C. Accept, at least partially, the Iranian framework: a permanent ceasefire, arrangements regarding Hormuz in exchange for lifting the naval blockade, immediate economic benefits, and postponement of nuclear negotiations to a later stage.
D. Undertake the significant risks associated with military operations, including ground operations, designed to deprive Iran, even partially, of its key leverage assets: control over Hormuz and its stockpile of fissile material.
A. Tehran’s underlying assumptions have not changed. From Iran’s perspective, it won the confrontation; the other side will blink first because of the accumulating economic damage; the U.S. is not interested in renewing the hostilities; and even if the war resumes, Iran retains the capability to inflict significant additional damage, particularly on the Gulf states.
Not only have these assumptions remained unchanged since the ceasefire, but they have actually been reinforced over the past two weeks in light of U.S. conduct toward Iran: Washington’s tolerance of delays in the Iranian response, the relatively weak response to attacks on American destroyers, the absence of any U.S. response to attacks on tankers and targets in the UAE, and the suspension of the "liberation project."
B. Iran is prepared for certain concessions, including on the nuclear issue, but is unwilling to return to the status quo that existed prior to February 28 and insists on securing vital economic and security guarantees.
The economic guarantees, deemed necessary for postwar reconstruction, include sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets.
The security guarantees, intended to prevent future attacks, include preserving some control over the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining essential nuclear capabilities.
Therefore:
A. Iran is unwilling to relinquish its two most significant leverage cards — control over Hormuz and fissile material — before a final and definitive end to the war.
B. Iran will demand substantial economic relief already in the early stages of implementing any agreement, based on the assumption that there is no certainty negotiations will progress in a way that enables it to obtain such benefits later on.
C. Iran is unwilling to permanently dismantle capabilities, for example, nuclear infrastructure, in a way that would prevent it from restoring them in the future.
There is considerable doubt that these underlying assumptions will change even if economic pressure continues or military strikes are renewed. Faced with a choice between war and capitulation to U.S. dictates, the Iranian leadership chooses war. This was true before the war, and it is even more true under the “new” leadership in Tehran headed by Mojtaba Khamenei and the IRGC.
The U.S. currently faces four main options—none of them particularly good:
A. Continue economic pressure despite growing recognition in Washington itself (as reflected in the intelligence assessment published last week) that Iran likely has the ability to withstand the naval blockade for months.
B. Launch another offensive operation aimed primarily at inflicting pain on Iran and further complicating postwar reconstruction through attacks on infrastructure and power stations, although it is highly doubtful such a move would alter the calculations of the leadership in Tehran.
C. Accept, at least partially, the Iranian framework: a permanent ceasefire, arrangements regarding Hormuz in exchange for lifting the naval blockade, immediate economic benefits, and postponement of nuclear negotiations to a later stage.
D. Undertake the significant risks associated with military operations, including ground operations, designed to deprive Iran, even partially, of its key leverage assets: control over Hormuz and its stockpile of fissile material.